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Abstract
Transition into the labour market is a crucial moment for young adults, as it yields a number of
choices that may affect their lives not only in the short-term but also in the medium- and long-run.
Here, I focus on two key aspects. First, I investigate residential location choices in the first years
after leaving full-time education and evaluate the relative importance of individual, family and
regional characteristics that lead young adults to move away from the place of origin. Second, I
evaluate the impact of experiencing job instability during the first years of the individuals’ careers
on fertility decisions in the short-run. In both cases, I deal with endogeneity issues and find that
individual observable and unobservable characteristics are the main factors that drive these choices
in early adulthood.
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Summary
Transition into adulthood typically involves a number of crucial passages: finishing full-time educa-
tion; entry into the labour market; leaving home; establishment of an independent household; and
entry into marriage and parenthood (Kiernan, 1991). The scope of this thesis is to evaluate two
main aspects concerning transition into adulthood: the reasons behind the decision to leave the
parental home and the link between job instability and fertility choices in the short run. The focus
is specifically on the United Kingdom, which is characterised by a relatively mobile population and
flexible labour market.
In the first Chapter, I survey the existing literature on both residential mobility decisions and
fertility choices in association to job instability, with a special attention towards labour market
entrants.
In the second Chapter, I investigate the link between residential location choices of young adults
in the United Kingdom and a number of individual, family and regional features. In the literature,
the main driving forces that push young individuals to move are found to be individual preferences
and educational attainment, given that more skilled individuals are more likely to stretch out to a
wider labour market than their unskilled counterparts (Champion et al., 1998; Krabel and Flo¨ther,
2012; Lø ken et al., 2013). Environmental factors, on the other hand, are important only to some
extent, where metropolitan areas tend to have an attractive power and regions characterised by
high unemployment rates are often associated with a high number of emigrants Wagner (1990);
Berrington et al. (2013).
In my analysis, I first estimate a single-equation ordered probit model and find that graduates,
movers and, to a smaller extent, people coming from urbanised areas are significantly more likely
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to move farther away from their place of origin, while family characteristics do not seem to matter
much. Then, I account for potential endogeneity issues that may be generated by omitted individual
ambition by using a semi-ordered bivariate probit model Weiss (1993); Sajaia (2008); Greene and
Hensher (2009). Here, schooling is, in turn, positively influenced by educational aspirations of
individuals when they were in their early teenage years. When using this two-equation model,
I find that graduates are 27 percentage points less likely to stay in the parental household after
leaving full-time education and 5 to 11 percentage points more likely to move away compared to
less educated youths, whereas these effects in the baseline model range between 14 and 3 to 6 p.p.,
respectively. Robustness checks carried by using probits and a differently specified ordered probit
model confirm the baseline findings.
In the third Chapter, I analyse the short-run effects of experiencing job instability at the
beginning of the career on fertility choices. The existing literature, both theoretical and empirical,
predicts that the choice of becoming a parent is largely conditioned by individual preferences over
parenthood, financial constraints and job-related conditions Butz and Ward (1979); Ahn and Mira
(2002); Francesconi (2002). While the demand for children for men is typically subject to a pure
income effect, the case of women provides for an additional substitution effect that counterbalances
the income effect and may even dominate it, under certain circumstances. The raising concerns
about the disruptive effects on fertility of youth unemployment and job instability in general that
have been emerging in the last few decades (Del Bono et al., 2015; Auer and Danzer, 2014), are
the founding rationale behind my analysis.
After controlling for a number of individual characteristics and coherently with the recent
literature, I find that the benchmark Poisson model suggests a negative and significant, although
small in magnitude, association between the number of job changes in the first four years of one’s
career and the number of children born by the fifth year into the labour market. When I allow for
the presence of endogeneity between labour market experience and parenthood choices, however,
this effect is completely wiped out. This suggests that in the short-run the choice of having a child
is independent of fluctuations in employment experience and may, instead, have to do mainly with
individual preferences and attitude towards family composition.
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Chapter 1
Sources of Residential Location and
Childbearing Decisions in Early
Adulthood: a Survey
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1.1 Introduction
Transition into adulthood typically involves a number of crucial passages: finishing full-time ed-
ucation; entry into the labour market; leaving home; establishment of an independent household;
and entry into marriage and parenthood (Kiernan, 1991). These do not necessarily occur in this
order and are not all to be experienced by everyone. Yet, getting a job seems to be the critical step
that is most commonly associated to a definite passage into being considered an adult (Toulemon,
2010).
In Kiernan’s (1991) analysis on British young adults aged 16 to 30, entrance into the labour
market is found to be almost contemporaneous to leaving full time education for both young men
and young women. These two are the very first steps that the large majority of young adults
undertakes in this country: around 90% leave full-time education and enter the labour market by
age 19.
The subsequent steps that characterise transition into adulthood generally take place some time
after. In particular, leaving the parental household is usually conditional on having a job, because
the latter allows the individual to be financially independent, but differently from parenthood,
it is not an irreversible commitment and is more widespread, even at younger ages: moving out
from one’s parental house and marriage are becoming increasingly unrelated, as more young people
decide to live independently prior to marriage (Jones, 1987; Toulemon, 2010). Women leave the
parental nest almost two years earlier than males, although 30% of them returns home at some
stage.1 Marriage and parenthood occur at a later age: by age 23, 54% of women are married and
30% had at least one child, while the corresponding shares for men are 32% and 15%, respectively
(Kiernan, 1991).
Cordo´n (1997), using data from the Labour Force Survey, argues that the indicators related
to this kind of phenomenon show remarkable heterogeneity within Europe, in spite of the overall
alignment of EU countries from both the social and the economic perspectives.
1Returners are mainly those who moved out to pursue higher education, who are also those who left earlier. This
is consistent with the idea that having a job is a prerequisite to living independently and that lack of employment
may delay moving out from one’s parental house (Jones, 1987). On the other hand, children who moved out to get
married are very unlikely to return to the household of origin at any point.
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In fact, Billari (2004) identifies two diametrically opposed patterns in age at home-leaving: the
‘latest-late’ pattern in Southern Europe, where on average youngsters leave home at a late age,
when they move in with a partner, and the ‘earliest-early’ pattern of transition of Nordic countries,
where the parental home is left around age 19/20 and is not necessarily linked to union formation
processes, with the remaining European societies laying in between the two opposite circumstances.2
Toulemon (2010) describes an analogous picture, but focuses specifically on gender differences and
claims that the gap between men and women, although very large across all European countries,
is narrowing in the Southern countries, but widening in Eastern Europe.
Still, while the common belief concerning transition into adulthood trends across Europe during
the second half of the twentieth century is for it to be defined as ‘early, contracted and simple’,
Billari and Liefbroer (2010) claim that a new pattern is emerging and that this is characterized as
being ‘late, protracted and complex’: most events occur much later in life compared to the past,
they take place within a longer time-span and are relatively many more than those that would
occur in the past decades.
The scope of this thesis is to evaluate two main aspects concerning transition into adulthood:
the reasons behind the decision to leave the parental home and the link between job instability
and fertility choices in the short run. The focus is specifically on the United Kingdom, which is
characterised by a relatively mobile population and flexible labour market. In the remainder of this
Chapter, I evaluate the existing literature on both residential mobility and fertility choices, with a
special attention towards labour market entrants. In the second Chapter I analyse the determinants
of geographical mobility in the first years after leaving education. The third Chapter deals with the
decision to become a parent in association to different patterns of job experience at the beginning
of one’s career.
1.2 The Determinants of Geographical Relocation
Age or, rather, the stage of an individual’s life course is a very important predictor of mobility,
where each sub-group of the population responds to specific determinants and has a distinctive
2See also Scherer (2004, 2005).
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migration behaviour with respect to other categories. The literature, regardless of the country and
the time period examined, agrees on young people being the most mobile subgroup of all, with a
peak in the early 20s: “Almost half of all moves within England are undertaken by people aged
16-29 despite the fact that they make up under one-fifth of the total population” (Champion et al.,
1998, p. 57). This time of their life generally coincides with them leaving the parental house,
finding a job, possibly starting a family and it is characterised by frequent and long-distance moves
(Champion et al., 1998).
Among the reasons why this happens, very young people typically have fewer family and asset
constraints to account for: they are unlikely to have started a family or to have children and to
be house-owners, hence it is much easier for them to change address of residence (Mitchell, 2008).3
Second, they have a higher net present value of migration than that of older people because they
can amortise moving costs over a longer period of time. Aisa et al. (2013) try to model the optimal
age to migrate and argue that this would coincide with the youngest age possible.4 In fact, as
individuals stay longer at home, preferences for their place of origin grow stronger and determine,
in turn, an increase in the costs of moving.
The mobility behaviour of labour market entrants is typically affected by reasons that can be
separated into three broad categories: individual, family and regional characteristics.
1.2.1 Individual attributes
Individual characteristics include both fixed (gender, ability, personal propensities) and time-variant
(educational attainment, marital status) attributes.
Gender differences are not particularly striking, with women moving on average at a younger
age than men. This should be attributed to the fact that not only women typically marry older
men, but they also often follow their male partners, who are the primary earners in the couple,
3While marriage is one of the main reasons for individuals to migrate, especially for women, married couples have
a much lower mobility than single people. Similarly, parenthood substantially decreases the probability of moving,
particularly in families with school-aged children. In both cases, location decisions must account for the maximisation
of utility at the household level.
4Individuals become potential migrants as soon as they enter the labour market, i.e. at around 18 years old.
However, they find that in countries like Spain and Italy migrants are on average older (25-29 years old). They justify
the failure of theoretical predictions with the fact that models should not focus on income only but also consider e.g.
social factors and human capital (Aisa et al., 2013).
8
in their migration decisions - i.e. women are “tied movers” (Champion et al., 1998; Lø ken et al.,
2013).
Personal inclinations and ties with the place of origin do matter in one’s choice of moving. Krabel
and Flo¨ther (2012) argue that personal preferences and the willingness to move are a crucial factor
in the migration process. They find that the likelihood of moving from the university region for
German graduates is higher if the individual has moved in the past, where prior mobility is a proxy
for the individual propensity to move.5 The same phenomenon is found by Kodrzicki (2001) on
US graduates, who are 17% and 54% more likely to be mobile later in life if they moved state
some time before high-school age and in between high-school and college, respectively. Belot and
Ermisch (2009) claim that people with thicker local social networks are less likely to move, possibly
because on one hand, the intrinsic value of family and friendship ties is jeopardised by the high
costs of maintaining them over long distances; on the other hand, people with a lot of close friends
are more likely to hear about jobs nearby rather than at some other locations. On the contrary,
those who move generally have weaker social networks and this encourages further movements.
Educational attainment is also one of the biggest predictors of mobility, not only because in-
dividuals move to pursue education.6 In theory, if geographical mobility can be perceived as an
indicator for the width of the labour market, one of the following circumstances may occur. It may
happen that the higher the level of education, the farther individuals move because they can access
a wider range of jobs and better exploit the returns from schooling, while the less skilled would
be confined to a narrower labour market (Basker, 2002). On the other hand, it may be the case
that the better educated can more easily find a job in the place they live in, while their counter-
parts struggle and have no other option but to look for better opportunities away (the so-called
“poverty effect”). Then, one would observe highly-skilled workers being less likely to move from
high-unemployment regions to low-unemployment ones than low-skilled workers (Basker, 2002).
5Stark (2003) discusses the existence of a “taste for migration” and its implications.
6Champion et al. (1998, p. 98) argue that in England “one of the major migration streams which moves several
hundred thousand migrants each autumn is that of students into higher education”. In fact, according to (Belfield
and Morris, 1999, p. 243), “[o]ver half of students, 54 per cent, move away from their home region to attend HE”,
while a third does not move region at all, either to study or to find a job. Hillmert (2004), analysing regional mobility
of young adults in West Germany, finds that youths in the age class 15-21 years old move mostly for training or
education, while for those in the age range 21-34 mobility is predominantly employment-related.
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Many of the theoretical contributions centred on migration have modelled this phenomenon
jointly with human capital investment choices. Common assumptions are that the returns to
schooling away are greater than those at the place of origin and that individuals have a preference
for not moving, i.e. they have a preference for their home location.7 For instance, Stark et al. (1998)
use a simple two-period two-country model to show that if the individual is assigned a strictly
positive probability of becoming employed away, then she will be more prone to invest in education
than the case in which migration is not provided for.8 Dustmann and Glitz (2011) compute a three-
period model where the decision to move is taken by comparing the value functions associated with
the two options (to migrate or not), net of moving costs. In case migration occurs, earnings depend,
among other things, on the transferability of the human capital across labour markets and on the
time spent away. More recently, Kennan (2015) develops a dynamic programming model where
migration may occur both before and after graduating from university and costs and benefits of
education may vary across areas. By using US data, the author finds that individuals do, in fact,
move from low- to high-wage locations in response to economic incentives. He also finds that US
states where education is greatly subsidised induce more people to graduate from university and,
as a consequence, the level of human capital within the state increases. This is explained by the
presence of moving costs: some individuals eventually will move somewhere else but the majority
will choose to stay.
In the post-war emipirical literature there is not a clear and consistent evidence of an effect
of education on mobility (see, e.g., Wagner (1990) and Quigley and Weinberg (1977)), while in
the last decades a general consensus on the existence of a positive correlation has risen (Hillmert,
2004; Hoare and Corver, 2010; Machin et al., 2012). In the literature, this is usually explained as
a consequence of two circumstances. First, the existence of endogenous, and often unobservable,
individual and family factors (ambition, motivation, encouragement, expectations, etc.) which may
push individuals to get better education and, simultaneously, to move more. Second, the labour
7In addition, these models often allow for return migration.
8This is under the assumption that the wage away is strictly greater than the wage at home and that the cost of
schooling coincides with forgone earnings while the individual is into education (see also Stark et al. (1997)). Stark
and Dorn (2013b) allow for the inclusion of savings in the model, while Stark and Dorn (2013a) evaluate the role of
remittances and family ties of the migrant.
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market for these individuals is geographically distributed in an uneven way: while the demand for
unskilled or manual workers is by and large the same everywhere, metropolitan areas typically both
generate and attract better educated workers, who have higher opportunity costs for not moving
because of their higher expected returns to education.9
The field of study may also influence the degree of mobility because of the intrinsic character-
istics of some jobs and of the employability opportunities (Belfield and Morris, 1999; Buonanno
and Pozzoli, 2009; Krabel and Flo¨ther, 2012), while academic performance is found to increase the
likelihood of moving (Hoare and Corver, 2010), possibly by picking up some sort of ability effect.
1.2.2 Family and household characteristics
The environment in which an individual is raised is of crucial importance and the characteristics
of the parental household need, therefore, to be accounted for. In particular, the past literature
has found strong evidence of a persistence in inter-generational socioeconomic status, especially in
terms of education and economic outcome. As a consequence, individuals coming from wealthier
backgrounds are generally more educated and can afford moving away, while their poorer coun-
terparts choose to live in proximity to their parents in order to enjoy their support and be better
protected against labour market shocks (Card, 2001; Kaplan, 2009, 2012) and job insecurity (Becker
et al., 2010; Cobb-Clark, 2008).10
As far as the composition of the parental household and its merely demographic aspects are
concerned, Cobb-Clark (2008) finds that the probability young Australians live with their parents
decreases in the number of siblings and if parents are divorced.11 Similarly, Lø ken et al. (2013) argue
that Norwegian young adults are less likely to live near their place of origin when they can count
on a higher number of siblings or are at a later birth order, as they have less family responsibilities.
9With this respect, however, Rees et al. (1996), based on data from the UK 1991 Census, claim that the people aged
16-29 have been generally moving into urbanised areas even though on average there is some evidence for a “significant
redistribution [of the population] both downward and outward” (p. 78), i.e. from large cities to medium/small towns
and from urban centres to the outskirts.
10See also Berrington et al. (2013). They find that British young adults are more likely to return home if both
natural parents live in the parental household, although there seems to be no significant link with their income levels.
11See also Smits et al. (2010) and Ermisch (1999). The latter finds that British young adults are more likely to
move if they are cohabiting with only one natural parent or if they live in a large household (‘congestion effect’ in
the consumption of the household public goods).
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On the contrary, Konrad et al. (2002) find that German older siblings move more than the younger
ones, possibly because they can shift the burden of care-giving to their younger siblings through a
first-mover advantage. The same reasoning applies to adult children with siblings, who move more
than only-children (Rainer and Siedler, 2009).
1.2.3 Regional and macroeconomic features
When dealing with young adults seeking for a job for the first time, local labour market and regional
properties of both the areas of origin and of (potential) destination are of great relevance.12 Each
area is, in fact, characterised by three sets of features: attracting or pull factors, repelling or
push factors and characteristics to which people are indifferent to. It is true that these sets are
differently defined across people, given individual-specific preferences and characteristics, but some
factors seem to generally affect homogeneous sub-groups of people in a similar way (Lee, 1966;
Kodrzicki, 2001; Kennan et al., 2011).
In the case of labour market entrants, for instance, the degree of urbanisation seem to have an
attracting power because of the creation of agglomeration economies in metropolitan areas (Wagner,
1990; Berrington et al., 2013). Here, the gravitational pull is twofold: not only those people coming
from elsewhere are attracted by the higher concentration of jobs, especially high-skilled ones, and
by better facilities, but also those who were raised in that area are less keen on moving. This is
particularly true for highly skilled individuals, also because inner city areas are very costly in terms
of housing and therefore low-income households are induced to move to suburban areas. Similarly,
regions with a higher mean wage tend to be more appealing while a high unemployment rate
generally pushes residents away (Champion et al., 1998; Mitchell, 2008). Nevertheless, Berrington
et al. (2013) find no significant effect of the local unemployment rates on the attractiveness of the
location of the parental household.
12Much of the theoretical literature is based on the expected net earnings differential between locations. If this
differential is in favour of the location different from the one where the individual resides, then migration will occur,
and vice versa (Stark et al., 1998; Basker, 2002; Eggert et al., 2010; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Kennan et al., 2011;
Kennan, 2015). Yet, Stark (2003) argues that there are cases where moving is still optimal even in the absence of a
wage differential.
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1.3 The Determinants of Fertility Choices
Since the earliest studies on fertility choices, the common approach in the literature sees children
as normal goods (Becker, 1960), so that higher earnings are associated with a greater demand for
children, and childbearing decisions are taken as a result of a utility maximization problem for the
parents.
Butz and Ward (1979) are among the first to propose a static theoretical model of household
behaviour where utility is maximised with respect to market goods, leisure and child services.
They test their model with U.S. data against the pro-cyclicality of fertility trends and successfully
explain its patterns in the post-war period, i.e. the 1950s ’baby boom’ and the 1960s baby bust,
as resulting from changes in males and females incomes. They find that, when few women are
employed, increases in fertility rates are positively driven by increases in males’ income levels
because this causes a rise in the household overall income and a consequent increase in the demand
for children. When the participation rates of women is very high, however, an increase in their
wage levels determines a positive income effect on one hand and a negative substitution effect on
the other, the latter being generated by an increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time, under
the assumption that children are the wife’s time-intensive users. With respect to the overall effect
of a rise in the women’s wages, they find a significant and negative relationship with the probability
of having a child, suggesting that the substitution effect is the dominating one.
According to Butz and Ward (1979), fertility would increase, or at least go back to the original
levels, only in the case of a large fall in participation rates of young women, or if there was a
substantial increase in the supply of preschool or day care facilities. This is also predicted by
Walker (1995), according to whom government benefits to parents partially offset the effects of
wage increases on the opportunity cost of child bearing, in terms of foregone earnings.13
Nevertheless, Ahn and Mira (2002) argue that the model of Butz and Ward (1979) is not
successful in explaining the subsequent (i.e. the 1990s) fertility trends where the total wage effect
for women may have become negative, determining an increase in the demand for children. The
13Walker (1995) defines the a shadow price of giving birth in any given period as consisting of three terms: the
opportunity cost for the time actually spent caring at home away from paid work; the net direct expenditures; and
forgone returns to human capital investments.
13
authors claim that this discrepancy may rest on Butz and Ward’s assumption of continuous labour
supply response to wage changes. In the real world, however, women’s working hours do not
change continuously (i.e. discrete working hours) and therefore an increase in their wage will result
in higher fertility, as long as children are normal goods.
Furthermore, Ahn and Mira (2002) extend the model by Butz and Ward (1979) introducing child
care services to be purchased on the market.14 Under the assumption that the price of child care
services declines relative to the average female wages, the income effect of female wage changes on
fertility becomes even more dominant over the substitution effect.15 A similar conclusion is reached
by Ermisch (1989), who finds that the availability of childcare on the market has a different impact
across different categories of mothers: for low levels of income or high prices of market childcare,
children are looked after by their mother, given the low opportunity cost that she faces, and for the
same reason she is more likely to experience a higher fertility; if the mother earns a relatively high
wage, on the contrary, she will purchase childcare on the market but at the same time will have
to substitute these services for other consumption goods. Joshi (1990, 1998) confirms this finding
when using British data and claims that, given the very little recourse to paid childcare, the mother
usually takes responsibility in raising her offspring while the father is the main breadwinner within
the household.
Cigno and Ermisch (1989) and Cigno (1991) claim that women undertaking higher investments
in human capital will choose to have fewer children; on the contrary, steeper career profiles induce
them to have children later. The timing of births, however, may depend both on quality (Becker
and Lewis, 1973) or financial considerations Cigno (1983). According to the latter, “women with
high initial endowments of human capital will have all their children in the first part of married
life and then return to full-time employment, while women with low initial endowments will spread
childbearing more evenly over the fertile period”.16
14Del Boca and Locatelli (2006) provide a review of the literature in relation to social policies, job participation
and fertility.
15In spite of market child care services being supplied mainly by women, and their price being, as a consequence,
linked to the average female wages, Ahn and Mira (2002) argue that: (i) as the female participation rate increased,
women also tended to work in higher-skilled occupations, and to the extent that child care services are carried out
by relatively unskilled labour, their price should fall relative to the average female wage; (ii) as more women work,
there is greater pressure for more generous child care subsidies which reduce the net price of child care.
16Heckman et al. (1985), instead, claim that women who marry at younger ages have a more rapid pacing of
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The explanation by Becker and Lewis (1973), which distinguishes between quantity (the number
of children) and quality (the value of their consumption), is based on two key features: on the one
hand, the shadow price of children with respect to their number (i.e. the cost of an additional child,
holding quality constant) is greater the higher their quality; on the other hand, the shadow price of
children with respect to their quality (i.e. the cost of a unit increase in quality, holding the number
constant) is greater the larger the number of children. They argue that the income elasticity with
respect to quality is larger than that with respect to quantity. As a consequence, increases in the
mother’s educational attainment determine increases in the quality of children to the detriment of
their number, while increases in the mother’s wage are associated with a reduction in quantity that
is larger than the drop in quality.
More recent literature recognises a degree of simultaneity of labour supply decisions with mar-
riage and fertility choices. As Sheran (2007) argues, however, static models do not seem to be
particularly suitable to explain interrelated and dynamic processes such as family formation and
childbearing and current and future labour supply.
Barro and Becker (1989) are the first to introduce a growth model with endogenous fertility
decisions, where the choice is taken simultaneously to those about consumption, intergenerational
transfers and accumulation of capital and accounts for parental altruism (i.e. the utility function
of parents depends not only on their own consumption and the number of children, but also on the
consumption levels of each child). Francesconi (2002) develops a joint dynamic model of fertility and
labour supply of married women, where at each period they can choose whether to have a child and
whether to be out of the labour force, in part-time or in full-time employment. Among his findings,
he observes that a woman’s preferences for children decreases in her level of schooling and in her
earnings ability, i.e. “women with a comparative advantage in market work (or, alternatively, whose
earnings profiles are the highest) are those with the lowest marginal utility of children; conversely,
women with a strong preference for children are those with lower earnings profiles” (p. 374).
Analogous conclusions are drawn by Caucutt et al. (2002), who elaborate a dynamic search
model of family formation and labour supply: they find that, even in the absence of returns to
subsequent fertility.
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experience in the labour market, high-productivity women delay fertility and have less children:
women in the highest wage quintile have 64% of their children at age 27 or older, compared to
42% for women in the lowest wage quintile. Also, by allowing for endogenous marital decisions,
they claim that women with high wage levels delay fertility more than women with lower wages
because they are pickier than high-wage men about whom they marry. Using U.S. data, they find
significant changes in terms of quantity and timing of births over time: since the 1938 birth cohort
of mothers, more recent cohorts have fewer kids and have them at later ages, where around 30% of
the delay can be explained by the increases in the educational level of women.17
1.3.1 Recent Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on fertility is at least as vast as the theoretical one. The branch that
specifically examines the determinants of fertility choices at the micro level focuses mainly on the
role of labour market status, especially unemployment, both of the woman and within the couple.
However, as Del Bono et al. (2015) state, “unemployment is only one aspect of a more general
problem, a problem we may call labour market ‘instability’ and that might be at the roots of the
recent trends in fertility rates observed in many European countries” (p. 464).
From a macroeconomic perspective, a number of studies based on relatively recent data ob-
serve a positive association between labour force participation and fertility, with many researchers
advocating procyclicality of fertility, meaning that the rise in the wage of women during times of
economic expansions would yield an increase in fertility rates due to the dominance of the income
effect over the substitution effect (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Adsera`, 2004; Engelhardt et al., 2004;
Adsera`, 2011; Goldstein et al., 2013).
Gonza´lez and Jurado-Guerrero (2006) investigate the reasons why women delay childbearing
and increase their likelihood to remain childless by comparing four European countries (Italy,
Spain, France and West Germany over the period 1994-2001). They argue that the postponement
of motherhood can be attributed to both voluntary and involuntary motives. On the one hand,
17See also Van Der Klaauw (1996) for a dynamic model that accounts for the joint determination of marital status
and labour supply decisions. Similarly, Sheran (2007), following Van Der Klaauw (1996) and Keane and Wolpin
(2002), jointly models female labour supply with marriage, fertility and education.
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women are increasingly investing in human capital and participating to the labour force, which,
along with the widespread use of contraceptives, makes them able to give priority to career and
personal development (‘preference theory’, see also Butz and Ward, 1979). On the other hand,
childbearing requires parents, but especially women, to acquire some minimum conditions that
would allow them to comfortably engage in such investment. These can be summarised in the
following: job stability, a minimum income level, independent housing and some time flexibility.
Also, as Easterlin (1973) postulates, experiencing lower standards of living compared to those of
one’s parents reduces fertility.
Gonza´lez and Jurado-Guerrero (2006) find that having unstable employment relations lowers the
propensity of having a first child. At the same time, economically inactive women are more likely
to have a child. The authors also investigate the effect of institutional factors, as they are expected
to be of high importance, especially in the accommodation of family life with work obligations.
They find that, once the partnership is formed, institutional context seems not to matter much,
suggesting that this is mainly determining in the transition to an independent household and
partnership formation. However, Adsera` (2011) argues that high and persistent unemployment
rates in the country of residence are associated with both a delay and a reduction in childbearing.18
According to Ratcliffe and Smith (2008), “the decline in average family size was driven by
two trends – a decline in average family size among women who had children and an increase in
childlessness” (p. 9). They show that, over time, there has been a slight increase in the proportion
of British childless women (accompanied by a similar trend in one-child women), while the share
of mothers of three or more children has decreased more than proportionally. At the same time,
the proportion of women having their first child by the age of 30 has been steadily decreasing over
the past decades.
More recently, Auer and Danzer (2014) estimate the probability of childbearing when the woman
enters the labour market on a fixed term contract. They find evidence for both a postponement
of first birth and a reduction in the number of children in the first 10 years after graduation. The
results are particularly strong for women with secondary education, while there is no apparent
18See Gauthier (2007) for a recapitulation on policy evaluations concerning fertility.
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effect for men.
Del Bono et al. (2012, 2015) evaluate the effects of job displacement on the probability of
having a child by exploiting plant closures in Austria as an exogenous temporary employment
shock.19 They show that, after ten years, birth rates are reduced by around 10% for displaced
women, and the effect is largely driven by white collar women. They also separate the effects of
being unemployed from that of incurring in involuntary job separation per se and claim that the
negative effect on fertility should be entirely attributed to the job loss and not to unemployment,
as women revise their choices on childbearing because they need to find a new job and start a new
career (‘employability and career effects’). This is particularly true for career-oriented women.
1.3.2 The Effect of Childbearing on Women’s Labour Supply
An extensive branch of the literature on fertility also deals with the impact of parenthood on the
parents’ labour supply, especially the mother’s. This specific aspect is not in the scope of this
analysis, although mechanisms that are related to what comes after childbearing should not be
neglected given its irreversible nature and that choices about family formation necessarily account
for expectations about the future labour opportunities of both parents.
Davies et al. (2000) claim that having children affects the woman’s opportunities on the labour
market not only through an immediate effect on unemployment, due to merely biological factors,
but there are also long-term repercussions on her earning power and pension coverage. In fact,
couples with dependent children are less likely to have two earners (Joshi, 1998).
Joshi (1990), using British data from the 1980s, estimates that a mother of two earns half as
much as she would have done if she didn’t have children. When looking at heterogeneous effects,
low- and mid-skilled women are found to have much lower participation rates and earnings when
they have children, while highly-qualified mothers are only affected temporarily by the birth of
a child (Davies et al., 2000). This is in line with what the search model by Erosa et al. (2002)
predicts, that is women who break a job match to have children are likely to self-select from the
low-skilled end of the distribution of human capital.
19Del Bono et al. (2015) are among the few attempts to deal with the endogeneity issues within employment and
fertility.
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The institutional framework is crucial in determining the impact of childbearing on the woman’s
labour supply and welfare. In fact, Adsera` (2004) compares OECD countries and finds that fertility
rates are higher where labour market institutions easily accommodate entry and exit (e.g. USA
and Northern Europe), while high unemployment rates and rigid labour markets are associated
with lower fertility rates (e.g. Southern Europe). This is because generous maternity benefits and
flexible labour markets allow women to re-enter the market after maternity, while in the latter case
precarious contracts and high unemployment rates discourage temporary exits that are necessary
to the woman to have a child.
1.4 Conclusions
Leaving the household of origin and entry into parenthood, which typically coincide with the first
and the last step of an individual’s transition into adulthood (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010), both
appear to be closely linked to individual-specific traits and preferences and to one’s opportunities
in the labour market, as a consequence of the fact that “the main requirement ‘to be considered
an adult’ is still to have a full-time job” (Toulemon, 2010).
When it comes to residential location decisions, the main driving forces that push young individ-
uals to move can be reduced to personal attitudes and preferences and to educational attainment,
given that more skilled individuals are more likely to stretch out to a wider labour market than
their unskilled counterparts. Environmental factors, on the other hand, are important only to some
extent, where metropolitan areas tend to have an attractive power and regions characterised by
high unemployment rates are often associated with a high number of emigrants. In what follows, I
try to assess the relative power of some of these factors, by taking into account the indirect effect
through schooling attainment that preferences have on mobility.
The choice of becoming a parent, on the other hand, is generally found to be largely conditioned
by financial constraints and job-related conditions, after acknowledging individual preferences over
parenthood. While for men the demand for children is typically subject to a pure income effect, the
case of women provides for an additional substitution effect that counterbalances the income effect
and may even dominate it, under certain circumstances. The raising concerns about the disruptive
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effects on fertility of youth unemployment, and job instability in general, are the founding rationale
behind the analysis in the last Chapter, where I estimate the effect of having unstable working
conditions on the likelihood of having a child in the short-run, once macroeconomic patterns are
accounted for.
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Chapter 2
Residential Location Choices in Early
Adulthood
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2.1 Introduction
According to the general framework, individuals choose their residential location depending on the
difference between the expected utility from moving away and staying at the home location, which
includes both economic and non-economic aspects. Economic elements depend on local labour
market conditions such as average unemployment rates, mean wages and housing prices, as well as
on individual employment history (Angulo and Mur, 2005; Hatton, 1995). On the other hand, non-
economic aspects are related to individual- and household-specific preferences, which embrace the
individual propensity to move (Belot and Ermisch, 2009), marriage and parenthood (Lø ken et al.,
2013; Mitchell, 2008) and other amenities, such as those associated with quality of life (Kodrzicki,
2001; Kennan et al., 2011).
Young people do not, however, fit in completely into this framework, as not only they have
a shorter work history (Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2002), but they are usually found to have different
preferences compared to their adult counterparts: they are, in fact, less likely to be married or
have children and to own a house (Mitchell, 2008). As a consequence, they face less family and
housing constraints and their moving choices must be, then, necessarily driven by different factors.
While there exists a large amount of literature on regional mobility of the labour force in general,
the particular condition of young adults who have just exited full time education and are about to
enter the labour market has not received much attention. In fact, however, this specific group has
its own peculiar set of preferences which do not coincide with the ones of adults in general. It is,
then, worthwhile investigating the determinants of moving choices for this subset of the population,
also because they are very likely to affect the individuals’ future outcomes (Bachmann et al., 2010;
Hoare and Corver, 2010; Scherer, 2005). As far as the policy-making indications are concerned,
governments may find it desirable to ensure an evenly distributed skilled labour force across areas,
as this has repercussions in terms of local development and welfare policies.
In this analysis, I explore the residential location choice of young British adults who have just
exited full-time education and are about to enter the labour market. I evaluate the causal effect of
a number of factors on their decision to move away from their place of origin. These factors include
individual, household and regional characteristics, with an emphasis on educational attainment
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and the potential endogeneity issues that may be generated by omitted personal characteristics
(i.e. more ambitious individuals may be more inclined to pursue higher levels of education).
I choose to adopt a semi-ordered bivariate probit model (Weiss, 1993; Sajaia, 2008; Greene and
Hensher, 2009) that allows me to account for an exogenous source of heterogeneity in schooling
decisions which should not affect mobility choices, that is the individual educational aspirations
when the respondents are in their early teenage years (10 to 14 years of age).
This is the same approach that has been used, among others, by Armstrong and McVicar
(2000), McVicar and McKee (2002). Their analyses are both related to the educational attainment
of individuals in Northern Ireland. The first examines how the qualification level reached by
individuals changes with respect to the choice of participating to a Youth Training Programme or
to colleges in further education. When considering personal factors that may simultaneously affect
the decision to opt for a Government training scheme or for further education and the qualification
level at the end of the schooling period, the authors find no evidence of selection of students into
a specific training programme based on individual characteristics, contrary to what the raw data
suggest. In the latter, McVicar and McKee (2002) explore the effect of working part-time while
studying on during post-compulsory education performance: estimating a one-equation ordered
probit suggests an apparently positive and significant relationship between having a part-time job
and the qualification level achieved, but this result is shown to be misleading as, when a semi-ordered
bivariate probit is estimated, this relationship becomes negative and insignificant. When only part-
time work for working 15 or more hours per week is considered, the coefficient is negative and
significant, confirming that part-time work is actually detrimental to examination performance.1
Here, I first run a one-equation ordered probit as baseline model, where I find that individual
characteristics such as having a degree and having moved in the past positively and significantly
affect mobility. The same happens with an indicator for regional urbanisation, while family char-
acteristics do not seem to have a significant effect. Then, I adopt a semi-ordered bivariate probit
approach and find that, when including a proxy for ambition in the model, the probability to stay
1More recently, Eugenio-Martin and Campos-Soria (2014) model the household cutback decision in tourism ex-
penditure, simultaneously accounting for the destination choice and the fact that the decision of having traveled to
a certain place may be conditioned by the need to cut back.
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in the parental house decreases by 27 percentage points for graduates (versus 14 percentage points
in the baseline model). At the same time, the increase in the likelihood to move within the same
District, to a different District or to a different region ranges from 5 to 11 percentage points (it is
between 3 and 6 p.p. in the baseline ordered probit). Analogous figures are found when defining
mobility on the basis of Travel-To-Work Areas in place of the administrative Districts boundaries.
This suggests that individual propensity to get an education may have an indirect effect also on
residential choices later in life. The benchmark results are also confirmed by robustness checks.
The reminder of the Chapter is structured as follows: in the next Section, I explain how the
sample is selected; in Section 3 I describe the data, in Section 4 I outline the empirical strategy
and in the following Section I report the results; Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Sample Selection
The geographical units used in this analysis are the Local Authority District (LAD) and the Travel-
To-Work Areas (TTWA). These are the smallest units at which I am able to match all the infor-
mation drawn from the various sources. According to this methodology, the UK is divided into 408
LADs and 314 TTWAs across 19 Regions.2
While LADs constitute a mere administrative classification, TTWAs are intended to approx-
imate self-contained labour markets. The ONS (Office for National Statistics) defines TTWAs
according to the following criterion: at least 75% of an area’s resident workforce work in the area
and at least 75% of the people who work in the area also live in the area. The area must also
have a working population of at least 3,500, but many TTWAs are much larger than that (e.g.
the whole of London and surrounding area forms one TTWA). As a consequence, in some cases
TTWAs overlap LADs and Regions.
By disaggregating the data at such levels, I am able to improve the precision of my analysis and
2Districts are defined as at December 2001 and are aggregated in the cases where the population falls below
120,000. TTWAs are currently 243, as defined in 2007 using the 2001 Census information on home and work
addresses, but since my data refers to the previous decade, the classification used here backs up to 1991. For
details, see BHPS Volume A User Guide (https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/documentation/vola/vola.html, last ac-
cessed 19/06/2014) and ONS (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-guide/other/travel-
to-work-areas/index.html, last accessed 19/06/2014).
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account for intra-regional differences which would otherwise be undetected. Also, by using larger
geographical units there would clearly be fewer observed movements between units themselves
(Champion et al., 1998). On the other hand, the use of both LADs and TTWAs guarantees the
possibility of checking the robustness of the analysis.
2.2.1 The BHPS and the YOUTH datasets
All variables are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which is a very rich and
detailed survey that includes information on all aspects of people’s lives. It covers the years 1991-
2008 (18 waves) and includes a representative sample of the population of the United Kingdom.
All people aged 16 or above living in the eligible households are interviewed. The YOUTH dataset
relies on the young person’s questionnaires, which are submitted by all children aged 11 to 15 who
live inside the households interviewed within the BHPS programme. The variable used to correct
endogeneity in this analysis is drawn from this dataset.
Table 2.1: Sample selection
Description Obs Individuals %
BHPS raw data 238,922 32,336 100.00
Only young adults (aged 35 or under) 57,017 11,203 23.86
Only indiv who left edu since start of the survey 27,004 2,814 11.30
Only waves 5-18 24,240 2,737 10.15
Only non missing YOUTH info 13,577 1,350 5.68
I restrict the original BHPS sample to young adults aged 15-35 years, for whom the first ob-
servation is at 25 years old or below (see Table 2.1). Then, I keep all individuals who experience a
transition out of full-time education and into employment, unemployment or inactivity.3 Given that
some people record multiple transitions by going in and out of education with some interruptions,
I do not consider as undergoing transition those who suspend their studies for one year while living
with their parents (i.e. those who take a sabbatical year). As for the rest, I only take into account
the transition corresponding to the attainment of their highest academic qualification. This way, I
should be able to, at least partially, get rid of casual and temporary employment that young people
often take in order to earn some money during their studies and before finding a more stable job.
3Inactivity is specifically intended as “family care”, while workers in maternity leave are listed among the employed.
People in long term sickness or disabled are excluded from the sample.
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Table 2.2: Sample size by years from transition
t 0 1 2 3 4 5
n 1350 1148 889 693 515 389
f 991 847 683 533 412 317
kd 236 221 201 187 166 143
kt 179 174 148 143 127 113
% 100 85.04 65.85 51.33 38.15 28.81
Note: t, n, f , kd, kt are the number of years since transition,
of individuals, of families, of Districts and of travel-to-work-
areas, respectively.
Then, the sample is further restricted to those individuals who have been previously interviewed
in the YOUTH record, in order to ensure consistency when using IV. This includes dropping the
first four waves (years 1991-1994) of the survey, as the YOUTH survey starts in 1994.
Thus, the final sample consists of 1350 individuals who were in full-time education at the
previous period and are now in the labour market or inactive (Table 2.2). They come from 991
different households, spread over 236 Local Authority Districts and 179 Travel-To-Work-Areas. I
follow these people up until the fifth year after their transition into the labour market, while the
estimates reported in this analysis are all referred to the time span in between the second and
the fifth year. I choose this particular scheme in order to allow for adjustments that people may
undertake right after they terminate their educational career.4
2.2.2 Attrition issues
Unfortunately, the sample size decreases quite quickly: the sample drops to two thirds by the
second year after leaving education and to around 30% by the fifth year (see Table 2.2). On the
other hand, the sampling rules in the BHPS are such that there is no particular reason why bias
from sample selection should arise. The sample members interviewed at wave one of the BHPS
constitute the Original Sample Members (OSM), while from the next wave onwards: (i) any baby
born to an OSM is automatically listed an OSM; (ii) people moving in with an OSM or people
living in an household where an OSM moves in become Temporary Sample Members (TSM) and
are interviewed only as long as they live with the OSM. A small subset of TSM become OSM
4For instance, a large share of graduates returns to the parental house in the first year after graduating and then
moves out again (Jones, 1987).
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(i.e. if they have a child with an OSM), but the others are eventually dropped from the sample.
Hence, a share of TSM are dropped at every round because no longer eligible to be interviewed,
while the eligible adults who could not be traced in the following wave because out of scope make
up a small percentage of the sample: e.g. 3.6% in wave 9 and 5.15% in wave 14. Moreover, with
respect to the entire sample, “the BHPS attempts to follow all movers who remain in Britain and,
although attrition among migrants is higher than among non-migrants, Buck (2000) reports that
almost 75% of movers between waves 1 and 2 were traced” (Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2002, p. 372). It
may be the case, then, that the loss of observations in my final sample of labour market entrants
is largely due to young adults’ propensity to share their accommodation with peers of the same
age who are eventually dropped simply because of sampling rules.5 Hence, the bias arising from
sample selection should be negligible.
2.2.3 Geographical variables
Part of the literature makes a clear distinction between the concept of residential mobility and
that of internal or interregional migration, the latter being referred in particular to longer distance
moves which are generally combined with a change in employment or socioeconomic status.6 On
the other hand, residential mobility is primarily related to changes in housing type. Consequently,
moves within a certain radius or within specific administrative unit boundaries are often excluded
because they still potentially allow commuting to the place of work and do not necessarily imply a
major change in social group: Wagner (1990), having access to continuous data, uses a cut-off at
50 kilometres, while others set it at specific territorial levels (Belfield and Morris, 1999; Kodrzicki,
2001; Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2002; Krabel and Flo¨ther, 2012; Lø ken et al., 2013).
The BHPS offers two types of information on residence changes: a continuous variable, measur-
ing the distance of the last residential move in kilometres (the variable ‘distmov’), and some cat-
egorical indicators on the Local Authority District (LAD) and the Travel-To-Work-Area (TTWA)
where the individual lives at each wave.
Using a continuous measure would be ideal, but the variable ‘distmov’, as it stands, is not
5For details, see the BHPS User Manual, Volume A.
6See, for instance, Cadwallader (1992).
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suitable for the purpose of this analysis. In fact, this would be sufficient if individuals were moving
only once, but since many of them move repeatedly and my purpose is to define how far they move
from their place of origin in each period, I cannot recover any valuable information on the spatial
pattern of their moves. In fact, the information I can gather from the variable ‘distmov’ is, in some
cases, misleading: consider, as an example, an individual who lives in her parental household in
London at t0 and who were to move to Glasgow at t1 and then to Reading at t2. Then, the distance
measured by the variable ‘distmov’ would only be reliable when considering the individual’s first
move at t1, while the subsequent move would not be accounted for properly (the distance from
Glasgow to Reading would be reported, instead of the correct one from London to Reading).
At the same time, a simple dummy variable indicating whether the individual has moved in the
past year would not provide enough information. Hence, following Bo¨heim and Taylor (2002), I
choose to rely on the data regarding the District and the TTWA of residence at each wave and on
the details about the household composition.
The first step involves the identification of the starting point, i.e. the household of origin, where
the individual’s parents live. I take into consideration the fact that some individuals, while still
living in the parental household after transiting out of education, may move to another place with
their parents. Therefore, I account for these moves and define the household of origin as the one
in which the individual is last observed living with her parents. I also check whether the parents’
household can still be considered as an attractive locus for adult children after they move out. In
principle, individuals may have less incentives to return to their place of origin if their parents have
moved to another place and this may cause some bias. Only an irrelevant percentage of families
move after their adult children leave the house.
Once the household of origin is defined, following Bo¨heim and Taylor (2002), I build two ordered
categorical indicators, namely ‘mobility (by District)’ and ‘mobility (by TTWA)’, which are based
on the District and the TTWA of residence, respectively. The variable ‘mobility (by District)’ takes
value 0 to 3 if the individual has not moved from the parental household, moved within her District
of origin, moved across Districts but within the same region, moved across regions, respectively.
Accordingly, the variable ‘mobility (by TTWA)’ takes values 0 to 3 if the individual has not moved
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from her parental household, moved within her TTWA of origin, moved across TTWAs but within
the same region, moved across regions, respectively.
The use of this approach certainly improves the efficiency of distance measuring in this particular
context. Nevertheless, it does have weaknesses: e.g. two adjacent Districts may belong to two
different regions and therefore be accounted for as far from each other and, vice versa, two distant
Districts may belong to the same region and, consequently, they may mistakenly be considered as
near to each other. Also, being the data collected once a year, I have no information on potential
movements that may happen in between observations from one year to the other. Hence, in some
cases there may take place multiple moves within a same year that I cannot account for. This
introduces some measurement bias and an understatement of the frequency and extent of mobility
patterns that I cannot currently disentangle.
2.3 Descriptive analysis
At the year when they leave education, individuals are 18 years old on average and 65% leave
education with O levels or A levels, while around 12% has at least a first degree (see Table 2.3).
When exiting full-time education, the great majority goes into employment (almost 75%). On
the other hand, 22% is unemployed and only 3% is inactive. One individual out of five has been
observed moving in the past, either alone or along with her parental household.
Two out of three had high educational aspirations when aged 10 to 14. This variable is con-
structed using the YOUTH panel of the BHPS. Here, young respondents in eligible households are
asked whether, once the minimum compulsory schooling is reached, they are willing to go to 6th
form or college or if they intend to leave school.
On average, individuals have 2 siblings and come from a household where there were many
books. Almost 30% has a highly educated mother. These variables should pick up the degree of
open-mindedness and the attitude towards education within the parental household.
As far as the residential location of the individuals in the sample is concerned, the vast majority
still lives with their parents immediately after leaving education (see Table 2.4): only 15% moved
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics at t0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mobility] (by District):
- No move 1305 0.849 0.358 0 1
- Moved within District 1305 0.076 0.265 0 1
- Moved across Districts 1305 0.022 0.147 0 1
- Moved across regions 1305 0.053 0.224 0 1
Mobility] (by TTWA):
- No move 1305 0.849 0.358 0 1
- Moved within TTWA 1305 0.081 0.273 0 1
- Moved across TTWAs 1305 0.022 0.147 0 1
- Moved across regions 1305 0.048 0.213 0 1
Other mobility indicators]:
- Moved from parental hh 1305 0.151 0.358 0 1
- Moved to different District 1305 0.075 0.264 0 1
- Moved to different TTWA 1305 0.070 0.255 0 1
- Moved to different region 1303 0.062 0.242 0 1
Gender (1=female) 1350 0.516 0.500 0 1
Age 1350 18.412 1.863 15 27
Qualification:
- No qualifications 1257 0.232 0.422 0 1
- O levels 1257 0.375 0.484 0 1
- A levels 1257 0.274 0.446 0 1
- First degree or higher 1257 0.119 0.323 0 1
Status:
- Self-employed 1350 0.014 0.118 0 1
- Employed 1350 0.737 0.440 0 1
- Unemployed 1350 0.218 0.413 0 1
- Maternity leave 1350 0.002 0.047 0 1
- Family care 1350 0.029 0.168 0 1
Previous mobility? 1350 0.207 0.406 0 1
Educational Aspiration 1350 0.662 0.473 0 1
Birth position 1014 2.044 1.110 1 10
Number of siblings 1017 1.956 1.371 0 11
Mother’s education (1=further or higher qualification) 965 0.373 0.484 0 1
Books in parental hh (1=lots) 979 0.493 0.500 0 1
District of origin urbanised] (pop>10,000) at t-1 1224 0.725 0.447 0 1
Note: ? Takes value 1 if the individual is observed moving before leaving education. ] Missing for
those individuals whose District or TTWA of origin could not be recovered.
out of the parental household and just about 6% moved to a different region.7 After two years,
these percentages rise to 28% and 9%, respectively. Five years after transiting out of education,
one out of two individuals lives on her own, but most of them didn’t move much far: 33% still live
in the same District as their parents and 38% didn’t leave the TTWA of origin.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the place of residence (with respect to the household of
7Percentages related to moves across regions slightly differ depending on their definition due to the overlap of
some TTWAs, LADs and Regions.
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Table 2.4: Residential location over time
at t0 at t2 at t5
Mobility (by District):
- No move 84.90% 71.76% 47.93%
- Moved within District 7.59% 15.96% 32.90%
- Moved across Districts 2.22% 4.59% 9.33%
- Moved across regions 5.29% 7.69% 9.84%
Mobility (by TTWA):
- No move 84.90% 71.76% 47.93%
- Moved within TTWA 8.12% 17.68% 37.56%
- Moved across TTWAs 2.22% 3.56% 5.70%
- Moved across regions 4.75% 7.00% 8.81%
Other mobility indicators:
- Moved from parental hh 15.10% 28.24% 52.07%
- Moved to different District 7.51% 12.28% 19.17%
- Moved to different TTWA 6.97% 10.56% 14.51%
- Moved to different region 6.22% 9.41% 11.92%
Note: t0, t2 and t5 identify zero, two and five years from tran-
sition, respectively.
origin) by education and years from transition. The left panel summarises the share of youths
who live in the parental household in each year before and after transition. It is evident how the
share of those people who eventually graduate from university suddenly drops at the third year
before transition (year -3), which should coincide with the time when a number of them moves
out to go live near the chosen university. On the other hand, at year 0, i.e. the first year after
leaving full-time education, some of them return home (Jones, 1987) before moving out again at an
increasing rate. Conversely, less educated individuals start moving out from the parental household
around the time of leaving education but they do so at a much slower rate: at the sixth year into
the labour market, around one in two non-graduates still lives with her parents, while most of the
youths who went to university have moved out.
Similar evidence is provided by the right panel in Figure 2.1. Here, it is straightforward to note
that graduates move much sooner from the parental household and are also more prone to move
to a different region (i.e. long-distance relocation) compared to the less educated individuals. The
latter are, on the contrary, more likely to move within the same district as the one where their
parents live. Moreover, this pattern clearly persists over time (from year 0 to year 5 from transition
into the labour market).
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Figure 2.1: Residential location by education and years from transition
Note: the dot plot on the left shows the share of individuals living in the parental household from the fifth year before
transition to the ninth year after transition; the bar plot on the right depicts the distribution in percentages of the
residential location by education and by years from transition (zero to five years after transition).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In this Section, I outline the empirical strategy. I start with an ordered probit model, which is
the natural benchmark model to use given the characteristics of the dependent variable. Then, I
employ a semi-ordered bivariate probit model, which allows me to account for the endogeneity of
educational achievement, by allowing this variable to depend on the individual’s prior educational
aspirations. This model is the appropriate one to be employed, as confirmed by the ρ parameter
being statistically different from zero. Finally, I run two robustness checks. The first one consists
of running four separate probit models on four different dummies that are derived from the original
dependent variable. The second check provides an ordered probit model, where the educational
variable is a categorical variable.8
A similar, although not identical, methodology is also used by Bo¨heim and Taylor (2002). Using
the data from the BHPS, they look into the decision to move of British adults. First, they estimate
the probability of moving as determined by employment status and housing tenure, then they use a
bivariate probit model to account for the simultaneous determination of migration and employment
status changes. Finally, they distinguish the effect between short- and long-distance movers with
8Ideally, this latter model could be implemented as bivariate ordered probit model but unfortunately the number
of exogenous variables is not sufficient to ensure identification.
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a multinomial logit model. The approach chosen for this analysis, however, differs from the one
in Bo¨heim and Taylor (2002) because it relies on contrasting assumptions, which derive mainly
from the characteristics of the sample of reference. In the case of young adults it does not seem
appropriate to account for employment history and housing tenure, while it should be the case for
educational achievements and household of origin’s features.
2.4.1 Ordered Probit Model
The aim of this analysis is to investigate how far from their place of origin young adults move,
accounting for a number of individual, family and regional features. The empirical model to be
estimated is, then:
Mit = E
′
itβ0 +X
′
itβ + εit, (2.1)
where Mit is the distance of individual i from her parental household at time t. This variable takes
values 0 to 3 if the individual has not moved, moved within her District of origin, moved across
Districts but within the same region, moved across regions, respectively. The District of origin is
defined as the one where the individual’s parental household is located. Mobility choices depend on
the educational attainment Eit and on other characteristics Xit, which include individual, family
and regional features, as well as regional and time dummies.9
I do not include factors associated with the region of destination because of practical reasons:
while I can easily identify the LAD of destination for those who move, it is impossible to determine
a potential destination for the stayers. Nevertheless, the sets of factors associated with the place
of origin has a clearly heavier weight in the migration process because individuals have a better
knowledge on the actual situation of that specific area, while information on the area of prospective
destination is generally incomplete or inexact (Lee, 1966).
Given the nature of the model described in Equation 2.1, the baseline empirical model is es-
timated as a single-equation ordered probit model (Greene and Hensher, 2009). This is based on
a latent variable framework, such that there exists a latent variable M∗it which is related to the
9Household and regional indexes are omitted here in favour of a simpler notation.
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explanatory variables as follows:
M∗it = E
′
itβ0 +X
′
itβ + it, (2.2)
where the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. The observed
outcome is clearly Mit, where:
Mit =

0 if M∗it ≤ α1;
1 if α1 < M
∗
it ≤ α2;
2 if α2 < M
∗
it ≤ α3;
3 if α3 < M
∗
it.
and where αj (j = 0, ..., 3) are the estimated cut-off points.
10
2.4.2 Semi-Ordered Bivariate Probit Model
Endogeneity problems may arise as highly educated individuals may be driven to move farther away
because of hidden characteristics such as ability or ambition. Therefore, estimating the model as
in Equation 2.2 above alone, may lead to biased estimates of β0 (Greene and Hensher, 2009). A
way to reduce such a bias is to account for factors that may affect educational attainment, so that
the model includes simultaneously a mobility equation (Equation 2.2) and an education equation,
which is determined as follows:
Eit = S
′
itθ0 +X
′
itθ + υit. (2.3)
Here, Sit is a binary indicator for whether the respondent intended to stay in school when she was
in her early teenage years. The estimated model is, hence, based on the latent variable E∗it:
E∗it = S
′
itθ0 +X
′
itθ + uit. (2.4)
10The choice of the probit over the logit model is due to the fact that the extensions used in the following part of
the analysis “do not fit comfortably into the ordered logit framework” (Greene and Hensher, 2009, p. 222), therefore
I choose to discard the logit model simply for consistency. In what is presented in this subsection, however, relying
on one model or the other makes little difference in terms of result.
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The observed outcome Eit is defined as follows:
Eit =
 0 if E
∗
it ≤ τ1;
1 otherwise.
where τ1 is the estimated cut-off point in Equation 2.4.
The variable Sit is constructed as follows: in a previous session of the BHPS, called YOUTH,
respondents aged 10-15 are asked whether once reached the minimum compulsory schooling they
are willing to go to 6th form or college or if they intend to leave school.11 I restrict the sample
to those aged 10-14 in order to ensure an adequate lag between the time of the report and the
actual choice and, then, construct a variable that takes value 1 if the individual intends to pursue
education and value 0 otherwise.12 This should be a proxy for ambition and it should pick up the
individual’s attitude towards education. While this is likely to be correlated with the schooling level
eventually attained by individuals at the end of their academic path, there is no reason to think
it expresses any sort of anticipation effects on their future choices in terms of residential location,
as the question itself is purely referred to the willingness to stay in education after the compulsory
leaving age has elapsed.
In order to account for the endogeneity in the model, I allow the error terms from Equations 2.2
and 2.4 to be distributed according to a standard bivariate normal distribution with zero mean,
unit variance and correlation ρ: E(it) = E(uit) = 0, var(it) = var(uit) = 1 and cov(it, uit) = ρ.
Hence, I estimate a semi-ordered bivariate probit model (see Greene and Hensher, 2009 and Sajaia,
2008 for details).13 Identification is guaranteed by the inclusion of Sit in Equation 2.4 only (Sajaia,
2008).
11The exact phrasing in the questionnaire is: “Do you want to leave school when you are 16, or do you plan to go
on to sixth form or college?”.
12In case of multiple observations for the same individual, who may be interviewed more than once when aged
10-14, I report the modal value. Whenever the distribution of values for the same individual is bimodal, I prudently
choose the smallest value in order to avoid overestimation.
13The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood using the Stata command cmp.
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2.4.3 Further Checks: Probit and Ordered Probit Models
As additional checks, I also estimate four separate probit regressions and an ordered probit model
with a slightly different specification with respect to the main model.
I decompose the ordered multinomial mobility variables (both the one based on Districts and
the one constructed on TTWAs) and generate four binary variables: whether the respondent has
moved at all from her parents’ house, whether she has moved to a different District, whether she
has moved to a different TTWA, and whether she moved to another region. The estimated probits,
then, look like the model in Equation 2.2, but the dependent variable is now a dummy that is
equal to 1 if the individual has moved and equal to 0 otherwise. This decomposition is intended to
confirm the main findings of the previous models.
The ordered probit model, on the other hand, is specified as in equation 2.2, except for the fact
that educational attainment, Eit, is no longer a binary variable but an ordinal multinomial variable
that takes values 0 to 3 as follows: Eit = 0 if the respondent does not have any qualifications,
Eit = 1 if she attained O-Levels, Eit = 2 if she attained A-Levels, and finally, Eit = 3 if she has a
first degree or above. Therefore, we can define:
Eit =

0 if E∗it ≤ pi1;
1 if pi1 < E
∗
it ≤ pi2;
2 if pi2 < E
∗
it ≤ pi3;
3 if pi3 < E
∗
it.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Ordered Probit
Estimation results from the baseline ordered probit using District boundaries are reported in Ta-
ble 2.5, Columns (1)-(3). While individual and regional features seem to have a significant impact
on location choices young adults, family characteristics do not appear to be so important: having
a degree and being a female appear to have a significant and positive effect, as well as having
previously experienced a move. The lagged degree of urbanisation of the District of origin does
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Table 2.5: Estimates Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit
Dependent variable mobility mobility mobility mobility
(by District) (by District) (by District) (by TTWA)
Degree 1.097*** 0.434*** 0.465*** 0.436***
(0.164) (0.150) (0.175) (0.169)
Gender 0.448*** 0.462*** 0.497***
(0.072) (0.098) (0.095)
Age 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.189***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Prior mobility 0.586*** 0.594*** 0.612***
(0.115) (0.130) (0.130)
Birth order 0.041 -0.005 -0.007
(0.040) (0.051) (0.049)
No. of siblings 0.041 0.057
(0.037) (0.038)
Mother’s education 0.036 0.035
(0.127) (0.123)
No. of books 0.091 0.087
(0.114) (0.112)
Urbanisation 0.207** 0.222**
(0.094) (0.099)
Cut-off 1 0.615*** 4.827*** 5.181*** 5.238***
(0.043) (0.689) (0.709) (0.702)
Cut-off 2 1.382*** 5.690*** 6.047*** 6.224***
(0.092) (0.663) (0.692) (0.692)
Cut-off 3 1.778*** 6.122*** 6.468*** 6.571***
(0.086) (0.671) (0.690) (0.669)
Observations 2,208 2,048 1,847 1,847
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES
Time Frame t2-t5 t2-t5 t2-t5 t2-t5
Log pseudolikelihood -2077.617 -1814.064 -1620.019 -1568.554
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs are reported in Table A2.1.
also affect positively and significantly mobility. Family features, on the other hand, do not seem to
have a significant impact on the outcome variable.14
I also run the same regression on a slightly differently defined dependent variable, in order to
verify consistency of the previous estimates (Table 2.5, Column (4)). Here, mobility is defined on
the TTWA instead of LADs and estimates confirm the main findings, in terms of both significance
and sign.
In terms of magnitude, not much can be said just by looking at the betas in Table 2.5. Thus, I
14When excluding prior mobility from the specification, there are not relevant changes in magnitude and significance
of coefficients.
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estimate the Average Partial Effect of achieving a degree. Since the explanatory variable in question
is a binary variable, the APE is calculated as:
Pr(Mit = j|Eit = 1)− Pr(Mit = j|Eit = 0). (2.5)
Then, I can observe the increase in the probability of choosing the location j when a given
individual achieved a degree. Similarly, I calculate Average Partial Effects of having moved in the
past, having an educated mother and coming from an urbanised area (see Table A2.1). Columns
(1)-(4) refer to mobility outcomes defined on Districts, while Columns (5)-(8) are based on mobility
outcomes as specified using TTWAs. On average, the probability of not moving at all from the
parental household is 14 percentage points lower for graduates than it is for non graduates when
mobility defined on Districts is used. On the other hand, the probability of moving within the same
District, across Districts and across regions, is respectively 6, 3 and 6 percentage points higher for
those who achieved a degree with respect to non-graduates. Not surprisingly (Krabel and Flo¨ther,
2012), having moved in the past appears to have an even higher impact on current mobility: those
who were observed moving are, on average, 18 percentage points less likely to live with their parents
and 7 percentage points more likely to live away (3.6 p.p. to move across Districts). On the other
hand, coming from a urbanised District slightly increases the probability of moving farther away
from one’s place of origin. This suggests that individuals coming from very scarcely populated
areas (i.e. Districts with less than 10,000 residents) tend not to move much. Finally, the effect of
family characteristics such as the educational level of the mother is very low (and not significant).
Very similar effects are found when the outcome variable is defined over TTWAs.
2.5.2 Semi-Ordered Bivariate Probit
Results are reported in Table 2.6. Column (1) shows estimates of the baseline (single-equation)
ordered probit model and Column (2) displays the same estimates for the two-equation semi-ordered
bivariate probit.
I first perform a LR test to verify whether ρ = 0. If that was the case, then the semi-ordered
bivariate probit model would not be suitable because the error terms from the two equations (it
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Table 2.6: Estimates Semi-Ordered Bivariate Probit
(1) (2)
O-Probit Semi-O Bivariate Probit
Dependent variable Mobility Degree Mobility
(by District) (by District)
Degree 0.465*** 0.866**
(0.175) (0.438)
Educational aspirations 0.518**
(0.215)
Gender 0.462*** -0.098 0.460***
(0.098) (0.158) (0.103)
Age 0.188*** 0.425*** 0.155***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.050)
Prior mobility 0.594*** 0.543*** 0.531***
(0.130) (0.169) (0.121)
Birth order -0.005 -0.113 -0.003
(0.051) (0.113) (0.051)
No. of siblings 0.041 -0.032 0.044
(0.037) (0.094) (0.038)
Mother’s education 0.036 0.336** 0.004
(0.127) (0.154) (0.123)
No. of books 0.091 0.281 0.078
(0.114) (0.294) (0.108)
Urbanisation 0.207** -0.236 0.217**
(0.094) (0.267) (0.087)
Constant -11.105***
(1.222)
Cut-off 1 5.181*** 4.488***
(0.709) (1.086)
Cut-off 2 6.047*** 5.351***
(0.692) (1.077)
Cut-off 3 6.468*** 5.770***
(0.690) (1.067)
Observations 1,847 1,853
Year Controls YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES
Log pseudolikelihood -1620.019 -1957.337
ρ -.256**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered at the region of origin level. APEs are reported in
Table A2.2.
and uit) would be uncorrelated - i.e., “the bivariate model becomes a pair of univariate models”
(Greene and Hensher, 2009, p. 224). I can reject the null hypothesis that ρ = 0 and therefore I
can claim that a joint estimation of both equations is needed. In addition to this, I test whether
the cut-offs are equal to each other and always reject the null hypothesis. Also, the model passes
the RESET test for mis-specification.
The coefficient of the educational aspiration variable in the education equation is positive and
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significant. This confirms the hypothesis that respondents who had higher educational aspirations
during their early teenage years are indeed more likely to obtain a degree. As expected, older
individuals and those whose mother has some kind of further education are also more likely to
graduate from university. The estimated coefficients of the mobility equation are consistent with
the baseline model, both in terms of sign and of significance.
Average Partial Effects calculated for the mobility equation in the semi-ordered bivariate model
are coherent with expectations: magnitudes almost double with respect to the baseline, suggesting
that this model may be capturing a stronger impact of education on mobility for those individuals
who are more ambitious (Table A2.2). An explanation for this may be that these individuals
experience lower costs of moving because of their relatively less important psychological costs of
moving and are therefore more keen on leaving the area of origin and benefit from higher returns
from education in a distant location.
The likelihood of staying in one’s parental household is now 27 percentage points lower for
graduates with respect to non-graduates, while those who gained a first degree are 11, 5 and
11 percentage points more likely to move within the same District, across Districts and across
Regions, respectively. The relative weight of prior mobility is now reduced, but still significant,
as the two-equation model allows to clean the effect of ambition on residential choices: previous
movers are now 16 percentage points less likely to stay in their parental household and 6 percentage
points more likely to move away (within District or across Regions - the likelihood of moving across
Districts increases by 3 percentage points) than individuals who have never moved while in full-time
education. The effect of family (mother’s education) and regional (urbanisation of area of origin)
characteristics, on the other hand, does not change with respect to the previous one-equation
ordered probit model.
2.5.3 Probits
I split the two mobility outcome variables used so far and generate four different binary variables:
one which is equal to 1 if the respondent has moved from the parental household and equal to 0
otherwise; one which takes value 1 if the individual has moved to a different District or farther and
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0 otherwise; one which is equal to 1 if the individual resides in a different TTWA or farther and
equal to 0 otherwise; and finally one which takes value 1 if the respondent has moved across regions
and 0 otherwise. On these variables I run four separate probits (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7: Estimates Probits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Moved out Moved to Moved to Moved to
of parental hh other District other TTWA other Regions
Degree 0.155 0.590*** 0.589*** 0.648***
(0.193) (0.169) (0.164) (0.189)
Gender 0.632*** 0.172 0.300** 0.143
(0.114) (0.161) (0.132) (0.162)
Age 0.234*** 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.143***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Prior mobility 0.571*** 0.617*** 0.627*** 0.577***
(0.161) (0.140) (0.177) (0.154)
Birth order -0.023 0.008 0.017 0.117
(0.055) (0.082) (0.070) (0.096)
No. of siblings 0.089* -0.064 0.007 -0.173***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.072) (0.058)
Mother’s education -0.057 0.210 0.199 0.222
(0.141) (0.153) (0.152) (0.156)
No. of books 0.098 0.254** 0.255* 0.034
(0.123) (0.105) (0.130) (0.174)
Urbanisation 0.279*** -0.091 -0.006 0.173*
(0.103) (0.106) (0.163) (0.105)
Constant -6.215*** -4.885*** -5.062*** -5.794***
(0.797) (0.857) (0.811) (0.857)
Observations 1,846 1,786 1,816 1,753
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES
Time Frame t2-t5 t2-t5 t2-t5 t2-t5
Log likelihood -988.694 -584.753 -536.636 -427.788
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs are reported in Table A2.3.
Estimates and Average Partial Effects (Tables 2.7 and A2.3, respectively) partially confirm
the previous results, although it needs to be pointed out that the dummies are constructed in a
slightly different way with respect to the original variables used in the ordered probit estimations.
Individual characteristics maintain the same positive sign and high significance as in the ordered
probit model, except for gender in Columns (2) and (4). Family features, again, do not appear
to have a consistently significant effect on the probability of moving, although the probability of
moving long-distance is significantly and negatively affected by the number of siblings. This result
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would not support the hypothesis of a ‘congestion effect’ in the consumption of public goods within
the household Ermisch (1999), even though it does not provide sufficient evidence to rule it out.
In addition, the individuals who were raised in a urbanised District are significantly more likely
to move from their parents’ house with respect to those who come from rural areas, but the effect
fades for moves concerning farther locations.
Table A2.3 shows the Average Partial Effects on the probability of moving. As stated before,
the average effect on the probability to move out of the parental household is not statistically
different from zero when comparing graduates with non-graduates. This may be explained by the
fact that individuals that have ended their full-time studies are eventually destined to leave their
parents’ house, irrespective of the educational level attained. On the other hand, graduates are
11 percentage points more likely to move to a different District than non-graduates. Similarly,
the probability of moving to another TTWA and across Regions increases, respectively, by 9.5 and
8.6 percentage points for those who achieved a degree with respect to less educated individuals.
Individuals who were observed moving in the past are, on average, significantly more likely to be
living out of their parental household and also to have moved to another District or Travel To
Work Area (by 11 and 10 percentage points, respectively) or to a different Region (by around 8
percentage points) with respect to young people who never moved out of the household of origin
while in education. Again, the level of education of the mother does not seem to affect residential
choices of the offsprings, while coming from a urbanised area is associated with a 8 percentage
points increase in the likelihood of moving out from the parental household.
2.5.4 Additional Ordered Probit Model
As a further check, I decompose the educational attainment and define an ordered multinomial
variable that takes values 0 to 3 if the individual has no qualifications, O levels, A levels, first
degree or above, respectively.
Consistently with the previous evidence, the coefficients of individual and regional characteris-
tics are positive and significant, while family features do not appear to have a significant effect on
mobility Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8: Estimates Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3)
O-Probit O-Probit O-Probit
Dependent variable mobility mobility mobility
(by District) (by District) (by District)
Qualification: O levels -0.094 -0.206* -0.214**
(0.076) (0.117) (0.097)
Qualification: A levels 0.132 -0.125 -0.136
(0.081) (0.098) (0.097)
Qualification: Degree+ 1.108*** 0.293* 0.309*
(0.183) (0.152) (0.171)
Gender 0.458*** 0.471***
(0.073) (0.098)
Age 0.184*** 0.189***
(0.027) (0.028)
Prior mobility 0.593*** 0.599***
(0.117) (0.135)
Birth order 0.033 -0.008
(0.039) (0.050)
No. of siblings 0.033
(0.037)
Mother’s education 0.051
(0.124)
No. of books 0.106
(0.114)
Urbanisation 0.199**
(0.090)
Cut-off 1 0.649*** 4.717*** 5.045***
(0.075) (0.685) (0.684)
Cut-off 2 1.419*** 5.581*** 5.914***
(0.090) (0.658) (0.668)
Cut-off 3 1.817*** 6.012*** 6.335***
(0.097) (0.669) (0.666)
Observations 2,208 2,048 1,847
Year Controls YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES
Log pseudolikelihood -2072.015 -1810.278 -1616.723
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the region of origin level. Reference category: Qualification:
No qualifications. APEs are reported in Table A2.4.
In the ordered probit, achieving O-levels appears to reduce the likelihood of moving, compared
to not having any qualifications at all. On the other hand, graduates still have a higher probability
to move than uneducated individuals, although the significance of coefficients follows an irregular
pattern: graduates are, in fact, 10 percentage points less likely to keep on living with their parents
with respect to individuals with no qualifications, whereas their likelihood of moving to a different
District and a different Region increases by 3 and 5 percentage points, respectively, compared to
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their uneducated counterparts (Table A2.4).
2.6 Conclusions
The aim of this analysis is to assess the relative weight of individual, family and regional character-
istics on the choice of residential location for young adults, with respect to their place of origin. In
particular, I focus on educational attainment, prior mobility, mother’s education and urbanisation
of the area of origin as the potential factors that may drive relocation decisions of young adults at
the beginning of their career. I find that the decisive features in the choice of moving are identifi-
able in the educational attainment and the mobility history of these young individuals. Conversely,
family background characteristics do not seem to significantly contribute to mobility decisions and
regional attributes are of relatively little importance.
I also account for potential endogeneity problems arising from omitted unobservable individual
characteristics, therefore I use educational aspirations in the early teenage years as a proxy for
ambition. In doing so, I employ a two-equation semi-ordered bivariate probit approach and find
that, when considering more ambitious students, educational attainment has a much bigger impact
on the distance from the place of origin: graduates are 27 percentage points less likely to live in
the parental household after finishing full-time education and 11 percentage points more likely to
move to another region (the corresponding figures in the baseline model are 14 p.p. and 6 p.p.,
respectively). This might be due to ambition reducing the relative psychological costs of moving
for the single individual.
Consistently with the previous literature, having moved at least once in the past years has also
a fairly big effect on mobility, which may be due to having previously experienced a loss in social
ties and therefore being less attached to the place of origin as defined in the analysis. On the other
hand, family characteristics, including the educational qualification of the mother, do not appear
to have a significant role. Finally, coming from a urbanised area seems to slightly increase the
likelihood to move.
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Chapter 3
Timing of Childbearing in Early
Adulthood
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3.1 Introduction
As widely documented in the last few years, average fertility rates have substantially decreased
in the OECD countries, while female participation rates to the labour force has been increasing
steadily over the years: Ahn and Mira (2002) document that, in the period 1970-1995, average
fertility has gone from 2.45 to 1.63, while female participation rates has risen from 44.1% to 60.8%.
More recently, since the year 2000 fertility rates have started to rise again, as Goldstein et al.
(2013) find for most European countries, although the Great Recession of 2008 has had mixed
effects depending on the country analysed.1
Some argue that the increase in women’s participation to the labour force has been enhanced
by the introduction and use of atypical employment contracts, especially part-time and temporary
contracts, which should have made possible to help women match job obligations with family needs
(see, e.g., Scherer, 2004, 2009). On the other hand, some streams of the literature claim that
these types of employment yield non-negligible negative social costs that appear to translate into
“greater career instability, higher unemployment risks, lower upward mobility chances and [...] a
considerable risk of remaining trapped in fixed-term employment, [...] poorer working conditions
and higher (subjectively assessed and objective) employment insecurity” (Scherer, 2009, p. 529).
As a matter of fact, the decline in fertility seems to have started contextually, therefore the two
phenomena may be somewhat linked (Ahn and Mira, 2002; De La Rica and Iza, 2005; Auer et al.,
2013; Auer and Danzer, 2014).
However, as Del Bono et al. (2015) point out, employment experience is hardly exogenous to
fertility decisions and reverse causality issues are to be carefully dealt with. They claim it may be
the case, in fact, that women who experience a higher instability in the labour market (i.e. they
either work less or undertake careers with lower returns and higher uncertainty) do so because they
expect to have children in the near future. On the other hand, it could be that women who are
about to start a family tend to look for a more stable and secure job in view of the financially
important commitment that comes with the birth of a child. Coefficients on job instability would
1The authors find that total fertility rates have had little response to the shocks in the labour market in most
Western and Northern European countries, while they document a significant and negative association between
fertility and unemployment rates in Southern, Eastern and Central European countries Goldstein et al. (2013).
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be biased towards zero in the first scenario while they would be biased upwards in the latter.
In this analysis, I investigate the impact of job instability in early career, measured as the
number of paid employment spells over the first four years of labour market experience, on short-run
fertility choices for British young adults. In view of the potential endogeneity of employment history,
that may depend on unobservable characteristics and personal preferences, I choose to instrument
the number of job spells during early career with the share of temporary workers among employees
by industry and by region, as in Del Bono et al. (2015).2. This is to be considered exogenous to the
individual because variations in the demand for fixed-term contracts are largely and unilaterally
set by the employers, especially within the public sector (IPPR, 2010), with permanent contracts
being, ceteris paribus, strictly preferred over temporary ones by workers (Booth et al., 2002; De La
Rica and Iza, 2005).
The idea behind this strategy is that people who experience a highly unstable job market
history may choose to delay childbearing because they do not feel comfortable in opting for such
a long-term commitment such as having children (Gonza´lez and Jurado-Guerrero, 2006). If the
instability is due to involuntary reasons, it may be the case that less able workers find it more
difficult to find a suitable job match. At the same time, if the job instability comes from voluntary
motives, i.e. career-oriented workers may choose to switch jobs more easily in view of better career
prospects, it may be the case that these people have a preference for delaying childbearing (or for
childlessness) because of their comparative advantage on the labour market (Francesconi, 2002).
In either case, the use of the exogenously driven pattern in temporary employment should rule
out any kind of individual-related motives and isolate the effect of employment conditions on the
timing of childbearing.
I estimate a Poisson model for count data with endogenous regressors, as suggested by Wind-
meijer and Santos Silva (1997), where the GMM estimation provides consistent estimates for the
parameters of interest.
My investigation consists of the estimation of a benchmark Poisson model as a starting point
on the entire mixed-gender sample. Here, I find a negative and significant effect of job instability
2This is also suggested by Auer et al. (2013)
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on fertility outcomes at the fifth year after leaving full time education. When running IV-Poisson,
the effect of the job instability variable loses significance, while all the remaining covariates still
present the same coefficients, suggesting that having a high job mobility in the first years of one’s
career may not be an undermining factor in terms of fertility choices in the short-term. Rather,
prior educational attainment appears to have a greatly negative and increasing impact, with grad-
uates having around 0.31 less children by the fifth year compared to individuals with low levels of
schooling. I run the same specifications on the only-women sub-sample and find noticeably coherent
results.
Very similar findings are also given by the specifications that only refer to individuals with a
spouse (i.e. people who are either married or cohabiting with their partner). Interestingly, having
a partner that works seems to decrease the number of children born to an individual, but if the
partner is a male, the number of children is predicted to increase dramatically.
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next two Sections, I describe the
sample selection process and the data; in Section 4 I outline the empirical strategy and in the
following Section I present the results; robustness checks are in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Sample Selection
All variables are drawn from the 18 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).3 Data
on the total fertility rate and the average age of women at first birth come from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS), while those on the share of temporary employees by industry and by
region are calculated from the UK Labour Force Survey, waves 1990-2008.
I take all individuals at their fifth year after leaving education and evaluate their fertility
outcome, defined as the number of own children living in the household, at that time. I only
consider men and women who are childless at the time they enter the labour market. People who
are still in education or have children during that time are, in fact, most certainly facing all sorts
of uncertainties and may therefore generate self-selection bias.
My main variable of interest is the number of paid employment spells during the individual’s
3See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for a brief description of the main dataset.
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early career, which serves as a measure for employment instability. The most popular measures for
job instability in the related literature are the type of contract (especially temporary vs permanent)
under which the worker is (or was) employed and her employment status (De La Rica and Iza, 2005;
Gonza´lez and Jurado-Guerrero, 2006; Scherer, 2009; Huttunen and Kellokumpu, 2010; Del Bono
et al., 2015; Auer and Danzer, 2014). Since I do not have information on the worker’s number of
temporary spells in the previous years, I approximate this by using the number of all employment
spells, under the assumption that if individuals experience numerous jobs in a year, there must be a
high chance that they have contracts of fixed length because, ceteris paribus, a worker would always
prefer to stay into permanent, rather than temporary, employment (Booth et al., 2002; De La Rica
and Iza, 2005). Furthermore, Scherer (2004) argues that in Great Britain “short employment spells
have a negative impact on prestige, also when controlling for job position. It might thus be assumed
that very short employment spells signal very precarious careers in the British case” (p. 385).
In the literature, various lengths (often data-driven) are used to define a worker’s early career:
they can vary from one to three years (Stumpf, 2014) to five years (Lindberg, 2009; Gebel, 2011), to
up to seven (Gicheva, 2013), eight (Light and McGarry, 1998), and ten years (Carroll and Powell,
2002) after education completion. I set the length of early career to the first four years after
leaving education for several reasons. First of all, sample size issues force me to restrict the length
to the minimum. On the other hand, the number of years must be congruous. Most importantly,
though, I choose four years for consistency with the 2002 Fixed Term Employees’ Regulation, that
imposes a maximum of four years renewals for fixed term contracts, after which the employee
can only be offered a permanent contract. However, despite expectations, this Regulation did
not have a clear impact on the total number of temporary workers as intended here (fixed-term
and temporary agency contracts altogether), also because it only affects fixed-term contracts and
excludes temporary agency contracts (Salvatori, 2014). Unfortunately, this makes the Regulation
unsuitable to evaluate variations in the employment instability of individuals in my sample.4
4In addition, as the Regulation was implemented in 2002, individuals who would be fully affected by the new rules
would have ended their ‘early career’ only in 2006 or 2007, which would, in turn, have allowed evaluating their fertility
outcome in 2007 or 2008, restricting the sample of the potential treated to a few dozens of individuals. Nevertheless,
in my sample the average number of job spells before and after the Regulation entered into force does not exhibit
meaningful differences (3.47 and 3.75, respectively).
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In order to gather all information on the number of employment spells during the early career
for each individual, I isolate all people who have left education since the start of the survey. This
considerably reduces the sample size to a fifth of the original sample (see Table 3.1), although there
is no reason why this should yield any type of sample selection bias.5
Table 3.1: Sample selection
Description Obs Individuals %
(of which females)
BHPS raw data 238,922 32,336 (16,937) 100.00
Only indiv who left edu since start of the survey 47,829 7,597 (3,862) 20.02
Exclude indiv. with less than 5 obs 24,685 2,152 (1,117) 10.33
Only completed edu 22,363 1,928 (1,004) 9.36
Only childless indiv when left edu 20,189 1,740 (855) 8.45
My final sample is made of 1,740 individuals, 855 of which are women, whom I observe for at
least five consecutive years, starting from their first year after leaving education to their fifth year
on the labour market. This is the time when I evaluate the individuals’ fertility outcomes.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
My final sample is composed of people who are, on average, 24 years old (Table 3.2). Almost a
third of them gained at least a first degree, while around 60% attained some lower qualification.
As a proxy for the socio-economical level of the family of origin, I look at the employment status
and the educational attainment of the mother when the respondent was 14 years old. Around a
forth of the sample have a mother who had a high-skilled job, while 68% have a mother who did
not work at all. At the same time, only around 22% has an uneducated mother, while the share of
highly educated mothers is almost 40%.6
In the first year after leaving education, the vast majority of individuals in the sample is on
the labour market, with 14% of unemployed, while only 2.6% are inactive.7 Most people work
5See also Subsection 2.2.2 in Chapter 2 for a discussion on attrition in the data.
6Information on the employment status or the education of the father is not useful here, as it is available for only
a few individuals.
7As far as treating self-employed individuals is concerned, it is true that this type of employment carries very high
levels of uncertainty and self-employed workers should consequently be dropped. On the other hand, though, not
only the share of self-employed in the sample is very low (less than 2% in the first year after leaving education), but
also there is no real reason why the amount of uncertainty associated with self-employment should differ from that of
a short fixed-term contract when the variable capturing job instability is the number of spells in paid employment.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sex 1623 0.492 0.500 0 1
Age? 1623 24.490 3.802 19 39
Marital status?:
- Never married 1623 0.567 0.496 0 1
- Married 1623 0.433 0.496 0 1
Highest qualification:
- First degree or higher 1502 0.286 0.452 0 1
- A levels 1502 0.296 0.457 0 1
- O levels 1502 0.258 0.438 0 1
- No qualifications 1502 0.160 0.367 0 1
Mother’s employment status]:
- Not working 1618 0.675 0.469 0 1
- Low-skilled job 1618 0.082 0.275 0 1
- High-skilled job 1618 0.243 0.429 0 1
Mother’s educational attainment]:
- No qualifications 1229 0.224 0.417 0 1
- Some qualifications 1229 0.388 0.488 0 1
- Higher education 1229 0.388 0.488 0 1
Housing tenure†:
- Owned 1506 0.122 0.327 0 1
- Mortgage 1506 0.526 0.499 0 1
- Social housing 1506 0.179 0.384 0 1
- Rented 1506 0.173 0.379 0 1
Parents in hh† 1530 0.688 0.464 0 1
Employment status†:
- OLF (Out of the Labour Force) 1514 0.026 0.160 0 1
- Self-employed 1514 0.018 0.135 0 1
- Employed 1514 0.816 0.387 0 1
- Unemployed 1514 0.139 0.346 0 1
Monthly gross pay† 1175 838.968 566.33 0 7534.20
Sector of job†:
- Self-employed 1282 0.025 0.156 0 1
- Private firm 1282 0.745 0.436 0 1
- Civil service/Government 1282 0.121 0.326 0 1
- NHS/Higher edu 1282 0.070 0.256 0 1
- Other 1282 0.039 0.194 0 1
Spouse has a job? 679 0.885 0.319 0 1
Spouse’s monthly gross pay? 583 1368.686 1094.18 0 13039.50
Average no. of jobs in early career 1613 3.603 2.408 0 13
Average no. of weeks worked in early career 1613 37.031 16 0 52
Has children after 5 years 1623 0.156 0.363 0 1
No. of children after 5 years 1623 0.206 0.524 0 3
No. of children after 6 years 1401 0.278 0.609 0 3
General fertility rate? 1623 58.246 2.510 54.20 63.30
Claimant count (% of national avg)? 1623 101.169 51.27 16.70 282.93
Note: † in the first year after leaving education; ? in the fifth year after leaving education; ] when
the individual was aged 14.
in the private sector and the average monthly gross pay is just above GBP 800.00. On average,
individuals change in between 3 and 4 paid jobs per year and work for approximately 9 months
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the Number of Job Spells during Early Career
Note: Entire sample; the histogram on the left shows the distribution of the number of job spells in the sample by
number of spells; the boxplot on the right illustrates the distribution by qualification level attained.
each year. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the number of jobs during early career: while 6%
never worked in the first four years after having ended full-time education, 77% of the individuals
in the sample experiences at least two spells in the same period (left panel). The right panel in
Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of job spells by educational level. As suggested by Figure 3.2, a
higher number of paid jobs in a given year is associated to lower levels of income earned during the
same year.8 This is consistent with interpreting frequent job changes as a proxy for job instability.
As far as the housing tenure is concerned, at the time of entering the labour market, most
individuals live in a house with a mortgage (53%) or for rent (17%), while 18% are in social housing.
Nevertheless, almost 7 out of 10 live with their parents at that time, which is not surprising given
their young age.9
After five years from transition out of full time education, 43% of the sample are married or
cohabiting with their partner, while the rest have never been married.10 Of those who are married
or cohabiting, 90% have a partner in the labour market, who earns on average a monthly gross pay
of GBP 1,370.00.11
8A negative association is also found by Booth et al. (2002) and Salvatori (2014), both referring to British data
(the BHPS and the LFS, respectively).
9Compare the analysis in Chapter 2.
10A negligible fraction (less than 1%) is either widowed (1 individual), separated, or divorced. I treat them as
“married”, as they have a similar likelihood of parenthood to the married people, although results do not differ if
these observations are dropped.
11Note that the average monthly pay at 5 years after leaving education for the sampled individuals is GBP 1390.00.
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Figure 3.2: Average Pay vs. Number of Job Spells in a Year
Note: Entire sample; the number of job spells refers to the past year (up until Sep 1st), while the average monthly
gross pay (in GBP) evaluated in the month of Sep in the same year. The positive earnings when the number of jobs is
zero is due to this slight discrepancy in the definition of the variables, although this is the case only for 23 individuals
out of 260 who have not worked in that year.
The average number of children born after five years is 0.2, i.e. for every 100 individuals, 20
children are born. This variable is constructed using the number of own children living in the
household. As pointed out by Ratcliffe and Smith (2008, p. 5), “infant mortality and household
reconstitution will result in measurement error. However, low rates of child mortality and the fact
that the overwhelming majority of children stay with their natural mother in the event of family
breakup act to reduce the effect of these factors in practice”. A second problem that may arise from
the use of this variable is that older women may have children who have now left home: “assuming
that women start having children from age 16, the selection problems may arise from as young
as age 32” Ratcliffe and Smith (2008, p. 5). In this analysis, however, only individuals who are
childless at the start of their labour market experience are considered, therefore this possibility is
ruled out.12
The increase in the average pay from the first year is certainly to be attributed to tenure and job experience.
12This also excludes drop-outs from education due to the birth of a child.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the effect of early career employment experience on the timing of fertility, the
empirical model becomes:
Cirt+5 = exp(J
′
irtβ0 +X
′
irtβ + T
′
irt+5γ + δt + µr) + irt, (3.1)
where Cirt+5 is the number of children born to individual i in region r at time t+ 5, where t is the
year when the individual has left school. The main variable of interest is defined as the number
of paid employment spells during the first four years of labour market experience, or ‘early career’
(Light and McGarry, 1998; Booth et al., 2002). This is included into Jirt, where t indicates the
years t to t+ 4. Individual (Xirt+5) and macroeconomic (Tirt+5) controls are also included, as well
as year and region fixed effects. As I am dealing with count data, the model is estimated with a
standard Poisson model (Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997), hence the exponential specification.
In view of the presence of endogeneity in the model, I instrument the number of jobs during
the individuals’ early career with the share of temporary workers by industry and by region in a
given year. These are drawn from the Labour Force Survey (UK) and are computed as the within-
industry and within-region share of temporary employees over the total number of employees for
the relevant years.13 Following Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997), I use a GMM estimator with
additive error terms.14
Evidently, the share of employees working under temporary contracts is correlated with the
number of employment spells an individual undertakes in a given year: the higher the share of
temporary workers, the more likely is an individual to work under a temporary contract himself,
meaning that there is a higher chance of reporting multiple spells in a given year. In fact, I find
a positive correlation between the number of jobs and the share of temporary workers. At the
same time, this is to be treated as completely exogenous to the worker. First, according to IPPR
(2010), the public administration employs around 40% of temporary workers in the labour market,
which means that variations in the the labour demand for this kind of contracts are by far imposed
13See Table A3.1 and Figures A3.3 and A3.2 for a description of the series.
14The model is estimated by GMM using the Stata commands poisson and ivpoisson.
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exogenously by the government. Secondly, as De La Rica and Iza (2005) claim, for any worker,
permanent contracts are strictly preferred to fixed-term contracts as they are on average better paid
and more stable. Hence, any worker would always choose a permanent contract over a temporary
one, given the option (Booth et al., 2002).
By instrumenting the worker’s early career job history as described above, I try to clean its
impact on the timing of fertility and rule out any effect that may be driven by preferences and
unobservable characteristics. A similar approach is used by Del Bono et al. (2015), who instrument
unemployment experience of displaced workers with unemployment fluctuations at the seasonal and
the industry level.15
For the same simultaneity issues mentioned above (De La Rica and Iza, 2005), I do not consider
any information on the current employment status, including earnings and current housing tenure.
I only allow for housing tenure in the first year after leaving education, which could possibly pick
up variations in the socio-economical background.16 Simultaneously, this ensures avoiding reverse
causality where e.g. social housing may be assigned to low-income individuals in view of the fact
that they have one or more dependent children in their household.17 On the other hand, educational
attainment is not endogenous to fertility, as argued by Sander (1992) and Wooldridge (1997) .
The individual’s marital status, although potentially endogenous, is included in the main spec-
ifications because it is generally a prerequisite to childbearing.18 In order to ensure the inclusion
of the marital status does not drive my results, I also run the model on a sub-sample of individuals
who live with their partner (legally married or cohabiting).
As an additional check, I run the same specifications using a Probit model, where the dependent
variable takes value equal to one if the individual has at least one child by the fifth year and zero
otherwise. Finally, I evaluate the main fertility outcome at the sixth year after exiting full-time
15This is also suggested by Auer et al. (2013).
16See Robustness Checks in Section 3.6.
17Moreover, I ignore government benefits to families with children because of two reasons: in the time period I
consider, while child benefits are provided to all families regardless of their income and wealth levels, child tax credit
is aimed at low-income families. Still, when having a child, these individuals already have expectations concerning
their eligibility to the tax credit. The second reason is that this information is not fully available in the data, but
only for 131 individuals.
18Recall married individuals, here, include both legally married people and those cohabiting with a partner.
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education in order to verify consistency of the estimates.19
3.5 Main Results
The benckmark Poisson model ((Column (6), Table 3.3)) seems to confirm a significant and negative
correlation between the number of jobs in early career and fertility at the fifth year after entering
the labour market, where the effect is quantifiable as a decrease of the predicted number of children
by 7% for every additional employment spell. At the average, this corresponds to a decline of 0.01
children (i.e. one less child born every 100) for every additional employment spell (see Table A3.2
in the Appendix for Average Partial Effects). Indeed, this is a very small effect in magnitude,
although significant.
However, when instrumenting the number of jobs in early career with the share of temporary
employees (Column (7), Table 3.3), the effect seems to vanish. The first stage should identify the
association between the share of temporary jobs by sector and region and the individual measure
of job instability, where the higher the number of temporary workers, the higher the probability of
experiencing multiple spells of paid employment for the single individual.20 In the second stage, this
results in a positive but not significant coefficient (0.049) of the number of job spells on the fertility
outcome variable. This may suggest that after cleaning the effect of personal preferences and
unobservable characteristics that may influence the timing of fertility through one’s employment
history, having an (job-wise) unstable early career does not seem to affect fertility choice in the short
run. In other words, what may appear to influence negatively childbearing is not job instability per
se but, possibly, some unobserved characteristics that may push workers towards a more unstable
career.21
Such a hypothesis is corroborated by the associations depicted in Figure A3.1. Women who are
married by the fifth year after entering the labour market and who, at the beginning of the period
(i.e. the first year), agreed with the statement: “A husband’s jobs is to earn money; a wife’s job
19See Robustness Checks in Section 3.6.
20The test for over-identifying restrictions (Hansen’s J) is passed (p-value=0.6224).
21I also run separate regression by age class as in Auer et al. (2013), finding the same insignificance in the coefficients
of interest.
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Table 3.3: Estimates Poisson: Entire Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
Dependent variable Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
(5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs)
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.066** -0.035 -0.067** -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** 0.049
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.049)
Age 0.084*** 0.042** 0.047** 0.044** 0.046** 0.052**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Gender 0.825*** 0.422*** 0.442*** 0.417*** 0.449*** 0.618***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.159) (0.139) (0.140) (0.159)
Qualification: degree+ -1.031*** -1.304*** -1.128*** -1.266*** -1.262*** -1.408***
(0.213) (0.201) (0.244) (0.205) (0.213) (0.223)
Qualification: a levels -0.966*** -1.078*** -0.867*** -1.034*** -1.113*** -1.371***
(0.202) (0.195) (0.228) (0.197) (0.203) (0.205)
Qualification: o levels -0.604*** -0.633*** -0.556*** -0.604*** -0.663*** -0.695***
(0.180) (0.163) (0.197) (0.164) (0.166) (0.166)
Married 2.244*** 2.086*** 2.261*** 2.213*** 2.458***
(0.211) (0.238) (0.213) (0.216) (0.255)
Mother: some qualifs -0.287*
(0.170)
Mother: further qualifs -0.268
(0.194)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.345 -0.392 -0.391
(0.275) (0.297) (0.277)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.052 -0.121 -0.365*
(0.151) (0.155) (0.195)
General fertility rate -0.277*** -0.323***
(0.097) (0.102)
Claimant count -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -1.799*** -3.771*** -3.506*** -3.705*** -3.581*** 12.255** 12.949**
(0.512) (0.783) (0.822) (0.963) (0.822) (5.794) (6.099)
Observations 1,613 1,502 1,502 1,174 1,497 1,449 1,426
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Only Married NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Pseudo R-Squared 0.045 0.092 0.223 0.209 0.225 0.229 .
Log-likelihood -876.565 -761.050 -650.720 -529.235 -645.617 -618.096 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: ‘Qualification:
none’, ‘Mother: not employed’, ‘Mother: no qualifs’. Both the Poisson and the IV-Poisson models pass the RESET
test for mis-specification. Average Partial Effects and complete first stage estimates are in Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in
the Appendix, respectively.
is to look after the home and family” (i.e. more family-oriented women) have on average a much
lower employment experience during their first year into the labour market compared to those who
disagree with this statement (i.e. more career-oriented women). The number of jobs undertaken
is evidently much lower on average when the woman has had at least a child by the fifth year
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after exiting full-time education, but the difference between family- and career-oriented women still
holds. Although this evidence is a mere correlation and it is based on self-reported attitudes and
opinions, it still helps to understand what may be the mechanism underlying childbearing choices
in relation to the individual’s employment patterns. It may be the case, then, that the negative
effect of job instability on childbearing found in the benchmark Poisson model is strongly driven
by individual attitudes towards women’s employment choices, rather than being purely linked to
economic motives.
Females appear to be more likely to have children, although this result may be driven by how
fertility is measured and especially by children being more likely to live with their mothers, therefore
it must be handled with caution.22
Prior educational attainment displays a significant correlation to fertility in every specification
of the model: consistently with the previous literature (Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Gonza´lez and
Jurado-Guerrero, 2006; Ratcliffe and Smith, 2008), I find that the higher the educational level,
the lower the probability of childbearing. Ceteris paribus, graduates are predicted to have around
0.35 less children than people with the lowest levels of schooling.23 Being married is, as expected,
associated with a higher number of children (0.36 children more), while the social status of the
respondent’s mother, which should be a proxy for the family background, does not appear to have
any appreciable effect on fertility. I also control for the level of schooling of the respondent’s
mother in order to ensure the employment status of the mother correctly picks up the socio-
economic level of the family of origin and find little significance, though having a mother with
at least some qualification is associated with a lower probability of having children compared to
having an uneducated mother.24 National statistics on the claimant count (i.e. the number of
people claiming job benefits) at the District level seem to have a negligible effect on individual
choices. On the other hand, higher fertility rates at the national level are negatively associated
with the number of children, perhaps because general fertility rates refer to the whole population,
which is on average much older than the individuals in my sample, and because of the increasing
22See Section on Descriptive Statistics.
23See Table A3.2 in the Appendix for APEs.
24The employment status of the mother is preferred to her educational attainment for sample size reasons, as the
latter variable is only available in wave 13 and therefore its use determines a drastic reduction in the sample size.
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Table 3.4: Estimates Poisson: Married Individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
Dependent variable Children Children Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
(5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs)
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.084*** -0.059** -0.059** -0.058** -0.066 -0.059** -0.041 -0.073** -0.033
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046) (0.030) (0.044)
Age 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.077*** 0.085***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Gender 0.055 0.060 0.097 0.206 0.206 0.341** -0.673** -1.176***
(0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.147) (0.135) (0.160) (0.290) (0.329)
Qualification: degree+ -1.374*** -1.353*** -1.336*** -1.596*** -1.225*** -1.410*** -1.218*** -1.334***
(0.202) (0.204) (0.213) (0.220) (0.221) (0.232) (0.218) (0.226)
Qualification: a levels -1.161*** -1.139*** -1.219*** -1.506*** -1.017*** -1.073*** -1.027*** -0.991***
(0.197) (0.199) (0.206) (0.206) (0.210) (0.203) (0.206) (0.191)
Qualification: o levels -0.673*** -0.655*** -0.694*** -0.858*** -0.527*** -0.592*** -0.522*** -0.602***
(0.169) (0.171) (0.173) (0.173) (0.179) (0.196) (0.182) (0.197)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.254 -0.320 -0.110 -0.302 -0.259 -0.347 -0.295
(0.281) (0.306) (0.269) (0.314) (0.287) (0.320) (0.293)
Mother: high-skilled job 0.004 -0.071 -0.179 -0.098 -0.257 -0.114 -0.327*
(0.155) (0.159) (0.184) (0.159) (0.174) (0.158) (0.172)
Spouse has job -0.773*** -1.059*** -1.224*** -1.896***
(0.148) (0.153) (0.199) (0.236)
Spouse has job * Male spouse 1.131*** 2.140***
(0.334) (0.396)
General fertility rates -0.204** -0.284** -0.189* -0.312*** -0.197** -0.362***
(0.096) (0.117) (0.099) (0.119) (0.097) (0.119)
Claimant count -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -1.306** -1.800** -1.827** 9.947* 13.494** 9.027 15.047** 9.921* 17.758**
(0.620) (0.887) (0.887) (5.596) (6.828) (5.756) (6.939) (5.680) (7.031)
Observations 699 650 649 633 626 612 605 612 605
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Only Married YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R-Squared 0.053 0.089 0.090 0.098 . 0.117 . 0.126 .
Log-likelihood -571.389 -499.054 -497.526 -476.000 . -453.160 . -448.574 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: ‘Qualification:
None’, ‘Mother: not employed’. Average Partial Effects are in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
delay in childbearing documented in the last decades (Ratcliffe and Smith, 2008).
All the main baseline results are confirmed when running a Probit model (See Table A3.4 in the
Appendix), where the dependent variable takes value one if the individual has at least a child by
the fifth year and zero if she is childless: an additional employment spell decreases the probability
of having given birth by the fifth year by 0.79 percentage points, while graduates are 20 percentage
points less likely to have a child.25
Table 3.4 shows results for the sub-sample of married or cohabiting couples. Here, results do
not seem to change much. The coefficients for the number of jobs in early career are still negative
and significant in the benchmark specifications. This is slightly less pronounced compared to the
entire population sample, as one would expect in the case of people who already engaged in the
25These are Average Partial Effects.
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process of family formation. In fact, the model predicts 0.02-0.03 children less for each additional
job spell. Again, when instrumented with the share of temporary jobs, this coefficient loses all
significance (see Table A3.2, Columns (3)-(8) for APEs). When focusing on individuals with a
partner, (De La Rica and Iza, 2005, p. 69) find that “the delaying effect of education on entry into
maternity disappears”, suggesting that “married (or cohabiting) women are more likely to give up
their career prospects than women without a partner”. Here, the effect of schooling is still negative
and highly significant.26
A result that seems to be consistent with the theoretical predictions is that having a partner
that works decreases the number of children by 71%, but if the reference individual is a female
(i.e. the partner is male), then the number of children is predicted to increase by 210%. This
result is perfectly in line with the theoretical predictions that identify a positive effect of the male’s
employment characteristics on fertility, while working women are less likely to have children (Butz
and Ward, 1979; Caucutt et al., 2002; Francesconi, 2002). Unfortunately, the available data is not
detailed enough to discriminate between the effect of full-time versus part-time employment.27
Also here, coefficients estimated with the Probit model are coherent with the ones of the bench-
mark Poisson model, with an estimated decrease of the probability of having a child by the fifth
year by 1.7 percentage points, given an extra employment spell during the individual’s early career
(see Table A3.4, Columns (2)-(4), in the Appendix).
Substantially similar results are found when running the same model on a sub-sample only made
of women (Table 3.5). A higher number of jobs during early career is associated with a significant
reduction of fertility in the first five years after leaving education. Even if the effect is still very
small in magnitude (0.03 children less for every additional employment spell, see Table A3.2 in the
Appendix), it is three times higher with respect to the one for the entire sample.28
When using IV and accounting for the endogeneity of the variable of interest, however, even
this small effect disappears, as well as the effect of the educational attainment. As in the case of
26It must be acknowledged, however, that their sample consists only of women with a partner, while here I pool
both men and women because of sample size issues. Still, I control for gender in all specifications.
27I am aware of endogeneity issues generated by the inclusion of job characteristics, even if related to the partner,
but in the absence of a suitable instrument this is the best I can do.
28Also compare Probit estimates in Table A3.4 in the Appendix.
60
Table 3.5: Estimates Poisson: Women Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
Dependent variable Children Children Children Children Children Children Children
(5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs)
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.133*** -0.101*** -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.016
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.053)
Age 0.063*** 0.037 0.056** 0.042* 0.045* 0.066***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Qualification: degree+ -0.959*** -1.077*** -1.105*** -0.982*** -0.978*** -1.182***
(0.250) (0.246) (0.281) (0.253) (0.257) (0.297)
Qualification: a levels -0.992*** -1.024*** -0.925*** -0.942*** -0.979*** -1.215***
(0.247) (0.251) (0.277) (0.255) (0.260) (0.271)
Qualification: o levels -0.646*** -0.599*** -0.653*** -0.545*** -0.559*** -0.624***
(0.208) (0.194) (0.223) (0.197) (0.197) (0.235)
Married 1.369*** 1.315*** 1.396*** 1.373*** 2.344***
(0.197) (0.228) (0.198) (0.201) (0.297)
Mother: some qualifs -0.428**
(0.198)
Mother: further qualifs -0.320
(0.228)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.432 -0.425 -0.012
(0.342) (0.360) (0.311)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.221 -0.253 -0.608***
(0.192) (0.197) (0.231)
General fertility rate -0.311*** -0.420***
(0.119) (0.135)
Claimant count -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -1.483** -2.392*** -2.272** -3.239*** -2.437*** 15.070** -258.725***
(0.596) (0.885) (0.924) (1.097) (0.928) (7.078) (3.305)
Observations 794 743 743 608 740 727 714
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Only Married NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Pseudo R-Squared 0.078 0.095 0.157 0.168 0.162 0.171 .
Log-likelihood -510.407 -457.293 -425.929 -349.669 -420.347 -407.650 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories:
‘Qualification: None’, ‘Mother: no qualifs’, ‘Mother: not employed’. Average Partial Effects are in
Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
the previous estimates on the entire sample and the sub-group of married or cohabiting individuals,
the loss in significance of the coefficient associated with the number of job spells may be due to
parenthood choices being driven mainly by unobservable characteristics, or ‘family-taste’, which is
also suggested by the correlations depicted in Figure A3.1 in the Appendix.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Living Arrangements of the Young Adult
I also look at fertility choices while accounting for living arrangements at the time of entering the
labour market (Table A3.5 in the Appendix). In particular, I include: (i) the housing tenure and
(ii) whether the individual was still living with her parents. Coefficients are consistent with the
previous specifications, both in magnitude and in significance. This is particularly important to
ensure that the results concerning fertility outcomes are not affected by the living arrangements of
the young adult.29
Living in the parental household appears to significantly reduce the likelihood of childbearing
in the next five years. At the same time, living in a house that is provided by the local government
(social housing) or that is under mortgage seems to increase the number of children born compared
to individuals who live in a house that is fully owned. Nevertheless, significance is not consistent
when I use the IV-Poisson model, suggesting that there is no substantial relation between fertility
choices and living arrangements, at least at this stage of these people’s life.
3.6.2 Fertility at the Sixth Years after Leaving Full-Time Education
In order to check consistency of the estimates, I also run the model with respect to the sixth year
after individuals leave full-time education (Table A3.6). The sample size is slightly smaller now,
but coefficients are very similar to those estimated in the previous Section.
In particular, the negative and significant effect of the number of jobs during the early career
that is found in the benchmark Poisson model also disappears when using IV-Poisson, where the
benchmark model predicts the same decrease of 0.01 children for every additional employment
spell (i.e. one less child born every 100) as the one predicted by estimates evaluated five years
after leaving full-time education in Table 3.3. Again, the effect of the educational level attained is
negative and increasing with respect to having no schooling and being married or cohabiting with
a partner increases the likelihood of having an additional child.
29See Chapter 2.
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3.7 Conclusions
The recent literature has been increasingly interested in the concurrence of two different phenomena
in the industrialised countries: the rise in the labour force participation for women and the increased
delay in childbearing. With the strikingly diffusion of fixed-term contracts, many researchers worry
that the job instability created by these and similar forms of atypical employment may hinder
fertility choices of young adults, by leading couples to postpone or reduce childbearing (Ahn and
Mira, 2002; De La Rica and Iza, 2005; Gonza´lez and Jurado-Guerrero, 2006; Scherer, 2009; Auer
et al., 2013). All of these works, however, only capture simple associations between having a fixed-
term or temporary contract and fertility outcomes, rather than isolating a casual effect. To the best
of my knowledge, Del Bono et al. (2015) run one of the few analyses that account for endogeneity
of the employment status and characteristics. While they specifically isolate the effect of job
displacement, I contribute to the literature by looking into the effect of employment instability on
short-term fertility decisions after accounting for exogenously driven variations in the individual’s
job history. The topic is of great interest for the policy-maker that may wish to intervene in favour
of an enhancement of fertility rates and to stem the effects of childbearing delays that the recent
literature have documented in the last few decades.
I measure job instability with the number of paid employment spells during an individual’s early
career and estimate its effect on fertility at the fifth year after leaving full-time education. In the
benchmark model, I find a significant and negative effect of job instability, coherently with most
of the existing literature. When I use the share of temporary workers as an instrument, however, I
find that the coefficient of interest loses significance, suggesting that having an unstable career in
the first years into the labour market alone does not hinder the timing of childbearing in the short
run.
In line with the literature (Cigno, 1983; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989), I also find that education
has a significant impact on parenthood, with less educated individuals being more likely to have
children and the negative effect of schooling increasing in magnitude the higher the level attained.
Cigno and Ermisch (1989) suggests that this is due to the fact that women who undertake higher
investments in human capital choose to have fewer children. On the other hand, married women
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are characterised by a higher probability of having children when their partner is employed, as
predicted by economic theory (Butz and Ward, 1979; Ahn and Mira, 2002; Francesconi, 2002).
The main contribution of this analysis, however, consists of finding that employment instability
of young adults appears not to be so important for fertility decisions in the short run. An expla-
nation to these findings may be that the choice of having a child in the first years after leaving
full-time education is only marginally related to fluctuations in employment experience and may,
instead, be particularly dependent of individual preferences and attitude towards family composi-
tion. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the empirical strategy is such that the individuals
considered are particularly young and therefore the effect, or the lack of it, is to be expected to
change as these individuals become older and accumulate employment experience. The structure
of the dataset, however, does not allow a more thorough analysis. Looking in depth into the timing
of childbearing choices, including completed fertility, may be in the scope of future investigation.
Further study may also allow to separately disentangle the effect of voluntary and involuntary job
mobility during the individuals early career on fertility decisions.
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Appendix
Table A2.1: Estimates Ordered Probit: APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No move Moved Moved Moved
within District across Districts across Regions
Degree -0.144*** 0.058*** 0.028** 0.058***
(0.051) (0.022) (0.011) (0.020)
Prior mobility -0.184*** 0.074*** 0.036*** 0.074***
(0.039) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016)
Mother’s education -0.011 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.039) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016)
Urbanisation -0.064** 0.026** 0.013** 0.026**
(0.028) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
No move Moved Moved Moved
within TTWA across TTWA across Regions
Degree -0.135*** 0.062*** 0.021** 0.051***
(0.050) (0.024) (0.010) (0.018)
Prior mobility -0.189*** 0.087*** 0.030*** 0.072***
(0.038) (0.021) (0.008) (0.014)
Mother’s education -0.011 0.005 0.002 0.004
(0.038) (0.017) (0.006) (0.014)
Urbanisation -0.068** 0.032** 0.011*** 0.026**
(0.030) (0.014) (0.004) (0.012)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs in Columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) refer to Columns (3) and
(4) in Table 2.5, respectively.
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Table A2.2: Estimates Semi-Ordered Bivariate Probit: APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No move Moved Moved Moved
within District across Districts across Regions
Degree -0.265** 0.108* 0.050** 0.106**
(0.129) (0.057) (0.026) (0.049)
Prior mobility -0.163*** 0.066*** 0.031*** 0.065***
(0.036) (0.017) (0.007) (0.015)
Mother’s education -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.038) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015)
Urbanisation -0.066*** 0.027** 0.013*** 0.027**
(0.026) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs refer to Column (2) in Table 2.6.
Table A2.3: Estimates Probits: APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Moved out Moved to Moved to Moved to
of parental hh other District other TTWA other Regions
Degree 0.047 0.107*** 0.095*** 0.086***
(0.058) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022)
Prior mobility 0.173*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.077***
(0.048) (0.023) (0.027) (0.018)
Mother’s education -0.017 0.038 0.032 0.030
(0.043) (0.028) (0.025) (0.021)
Urbanisation 0.084*** -0.016 -0.001 0.023
(0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.014)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs refer to Columns (1)-(4) in Table 2.7, respectively.
Table A2.4: Estimates Ordered-Probit: APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No move Moved Moved Moved
within District across Districts across Regions
O levels 0.068** -0.028** -0.014** -0.026**
(0.030) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012)
A levels 0.044 -0.018 -0.009 -0.017
(0.031) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012)
Degree + -0.104* 0.033** 0.022 0.049*
(0.058) (0.017) (0.013) (0.029)
Prior mobility -0.185*** 0.074*** 0.036*** 0.074***
(0.040) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016)
Mother’s education -0.016 0.006 0.003 0.074
(0.038) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006)
Urbanisation -0.061** 0.025** 0.012** 0.024**
(0.026) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the region of origin level. APEs refer to Column (3) in Table 2.8.
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Figure A3.1: Number of Jobs by Fertility and Attitude towards Family Roles
Note: Sub-sample of 429 married or cohabiting women; marriage and motherhood are evaluated at the fifth year
after leaving full-time education; agreement categories refer to the statement “A husband’s jobs is to earn money; a
wife’s job is to look after the home and family” and are evaluated at the time of transition into the labour market.
Table A3.1: Region and SIC Codes
Region Region SIC SIC
Code Code
1 Inner London 0 Agriculture, forestry & fishing
2 Outer London 1 Energy & water supplies
3 R. of South East 2 Extraction of minerals,
4 South West manufacture of metals, mineral products & chemicals
5 East Anglia 3 Metal goods, engineering & vehicles industries
6 East Midlands 4 Other manufacturing industries
7 West Midlands Conurbation 5 Construction
8 R. of West Midlands 6 Distribution, hotels & catering (repairs)
9 Greater Manchester 7 Transport & communication
10 Merseyside 8 Banking, finance, insurance, business services & leasing
11 R. of North West 9 Other services
12 South Yorkshire
13 West Yorkshire
14 R. of Yorks & Humberside
15 Tyne & Wear
16 R. of North
17 Wales
18 Scotland
19 Northern Ireland
Note: The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are based on the 1980 classification.
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Figure A3.2: Temporary Employees by Region
Figure A3.3: Temporary Employees by SIC
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Table A3.2: APEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs APEs
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.0135** 0.00732 -0.0232** -0.0202 -0.0239** -0.0126 -0.0296** -0.0100 -0.0309*** -0.00296
(0.00580) (0.00733) (0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0142) (0.0121) (0.0134) (0.0106) (0.0101)
Gender 0.0843*** 0.0849*** 0.0379 0.0617 0.0812 0.101** 0.0732 0.102***
(0.0253) (0.0202) (0.0513) (0.0427) (0.0527) (0.0467) (0.0503) (0.0387)
Age 0.00905** 0.00773** 0.0223*** 0.0180*** 0.0312*** 0.0271*** 0.0312*** 0.0259*** 0.0125* 0.0124***
(0.00427) (0.00337) (0.00835) (0.00660) (0.00880) (0.00653) (0.00887) (0.00668) (0.00678) (0.00474)
Qualification: degree+ -0.345*** -0.306*** -0.782*** -0.794*** -0.666*** -0.593*** -0.663*** -0.540*** -0.350*** -0.317***
(0.0766) (0.0606) (0.171) (0.150) (0.161) (0.135) (0.160) (0.122) (0.112) (0.101)
Qualification: a levels -0.323*** -0.303*** -0.748*** -0.775*** -0.602*** -0.516*** -0.604*** -0.461*** -0.350*** -0.322***
(0.0744) (0.0565) (0.166) (0.142) (0.157) (0.128) (0.156) (0.115) (0.109) (0.0955)
Qualification: o levels -0.233*** -0.203*** -0.531*** -0.574*** -0.386*** -0.351*** -0.383** -0.332*** -0.240** -0.212**
(0.0684) (0.0537) (0.156) (0.134) (0.147) (0.128) (0.149) (0.117) (0.0989) (0.0914)
Married 0.357*** 0.275*** 0.314*** 0.291***
(0.0306) (0.0244) (0.0385) (0.0264)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.0682 -0.0542 -0.113 -0.0339 -0.110 -0.0762 -0.125 -0.0868 -0.104 -0.00258
(0.0439) (0.0334) (0.0949) (0.0795) (0.101) (0.0765) (0.0993) (0.0770) (0.0738) (0.0664)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.0240 -0.0512** -0.0286 -0.0532 -0.0396 -0.0757 -0.0457 -0.0947** -0.0670 -0.0984***
(0.0299) (0.0255) (0.0625) (0.0528) (0.0630) (0.0490) (0.0622) (0.0471) (0.0494) (0.0323)
Spouse has job -0.312*** -0.324*** -0.454*** -0.576***
(0.0613) (0.0469) (0.081) (0.074)
Spouse has job * Male Spouse 0.510*** 1.026***
(0.190) (0.368)
General fertility rate -0.0550*** -0.0481*** -0.0810** -0.0872** -0.0762* -0.0953*** -0.0797** -0.110*** -0.0854** -0.0791***
(0.0197) (0.0154) (0.0382) (0.0360) (0.0398) (0.0366) (0.0393) (0.0362) (0.0333) (0.0256)
Claimant count -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,449 1,426 633 626 612 605 612 605 727 714
Only women NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Only married NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is no. of children after
5 years. APEs in Columns (1) to (2) refer to Columns (6) and (7) in Table 3.3 (entire sample); Columns (3) to (8) refer to
Columns (4) and (9) in Table 3.4 (sub-sample of only married); and Columns (9) and (10) refer to Columns (6) and (7) in
Table 3.5 (sub-sample of only women).
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Table A3.3: Estimates IV-Poisson: First Stage
Poisson Poisson Poisson
Dependent variable No. jobs (4 yrs) Dependent variable No. jobs (4 yrs) Dependent variable No. jobs (4 yrs)
Year 1: SIC 1 * Temps by SIC -13.216** Year 1: region 6 * Temps by region -2.818 Year 3: region 11 * Temps by region 24.861
(6.104) (13.180) (17.823)
Year 1: SIC 2 * Temps by SIC -32.782*** Year 1: region 7 * Temps by region 5.880 Year 3: region 12 * Temps by region 7.074
(8.579) (11.408) (14.953)
Year 1: SIC 3 * Temps by SIC -22.799*** Year 1: region 8 * Temps by region -9.817 Year 3: region 13 * Temps by region 14.337
(7.844) (13.578) (15.371)
Year 1: SIC 4 * Temps by SIC -30.801*** Year 1: region 9 * Temps by region -9.914 Year 3: region 14 * Temps by region -10.551
(8.238) (12.045) (13.257)
Year 1: SIC 5 * Temps by SIC -27.216*** Year 1: region 10 * Temps by region 4.980 Year 3: region 15 * Temps by region 21.004*
(9.090) (13.056) (11.450)
Year 1: SIC 6 * Temps by SIC -19.969*** Year 1: region 11 * Temps by region 5.198 Year 3: region 16 * Temps by region 0.054
(6.334) (14.099) (11.289)
Year 1: SIC 7 * Temps by SIC -23.732*** Year 1: region 12 * Temps by region 12.289 Year 3: region 17 * Temps by region 5.324
(7.457) (11.869) (12.703)
Year 1: SIC 8 * Temps by SIC -16.125*** Year 1: region 13 * Temps by region 10.689 Year 3: region 18 * Temps by region 5.829
(5.693) (10.388) (13.492)
Year 1: SIC 9 * Temps by SIC -11.090*** Year 1: region 14 * Temps by region 15.863 Year 4: region 1 * Temps by region -4.688
(3.374) (10.733) (7.906)
Year 2: SIC 1 * Temps by SIC 19.981** Year 1: region 15 * Temps by region -17.245 Year 4: region 2 * Temps by region -11.268
(7.889) (12.406) (9.756)
Year 2: SIC 2 * Temps by SIC 23.361** Year 1: region 16 * Temps by region -5.153 Year 4: region 3 * Temps by region -14.535
(9.256) (10.517) (11.748)
Year 2: SIC 3 * Temps by SIC 23.902** Year 1: region 17 * Temps by region 2.847 Year 4: region 4 * Temps by region -19.495*
(9.514) (9.911) (11.474)
Year 2: SIC 4 * Temps by SIC 34.024*** Year 1: region 18 * Temps by region 13.577 Year 4: region 5 * Temps by region -13.005
(10.114) (10.888) (10.042)
Year 2: SIC 5 * Temps by SIC 29.607*** Year 2: region 1 * Temps by region -2.158 Year 4: region 6 * Temps by region -7.814
(10.903) (9.414) (12.148)
Year 2: SIC 6 * Temps by SIC 23.402*** Year 2: region 2 * Temps by region -2.932 Year 4: region 7 * Temps by region -11.984
(7.972) (13.933) (13.032)
Year 2: SIC 7 * Temps by SIC 23.530** Year 2: region 3 * Temps by region -5.144 Year 4: region 8 * Temps by region -21.592
(9.826) (15.107) (14.877)
Year 2: SIC 8 * Temps by SIC 21.849*** Year 2: region 4 * Temps by region 10.931 Year 4: region 9 * Temps by region -2.042
(7.237) (14.516) (14.911)
Year 2: SIC 9 * Temps by SIC 12.030*** Year 2: region 5 * Temps by region -24.968 Year 4: region 10 * Temps by region 1.093
(4.168) (16.553) (15.810)
Year 3: SIC 1 * Temps by SIC 1.816 Year 2: region 6 * Temps by region 11.075 Year 4: region 11 * Temps by region -30.316*
(6.669) (15.980) (17.800)
Year 3: SIC 2 * Temps by SIC 3.162 Year 2: region 7 * Temps by region 4.694 Year 4: region 12 * Temps by region -10.181
(10.972) (14.701) (11.624)
Year 3: SIC 3 * Temps by SIC 4.303 Year 2: region 8 * Temps by region 17.592 Year 4: region 13 * Temps by region -24.947**
(10.366) (23.158) (10.901)
Year 3: SIC 4 * Temps by SIC 5.273 Year 2: region 9 * Temps by region 6.787 Year 4: region 14 * Temps by region -15.063
(11.971) (16.842) (9.815)
Year 3: SIC 5 * Temps by SIC 2.013 Year 2: region 10 * Temps by region -1.303 Year 4: region 15 * Temps by region -21.915*
(11.983) (15.408) (11.466)
Year 3: SIC 6 * Temps by SIC 2.142 Year 2: region 11 * Temps by region -6.276 Year 4: region 16 * Temps by region -14.062
(8.686) (17.193) (9.072)
Year 3: SIC 7 * Temps by SIC 0.245 Year 2: region 12 * Temps by region 1.419 Year 4: region 17 * Temps by region -11.007
(10.235) (14.922) (9.932)
Year 3: SIC 8 * Temps by SIC -0.230 Year 2: region 13 * Temps by region 4.024 Year 4: region 18 * Temps by region -6.110
(7.901) (13.906) (9.383)
Year 3: SIC 9 * Temps by SIC -0.287 Year 2: region 14 * Temps by region 0.000 Age -0.005
(4.528) (0.000) (0.006)
Year 4: SIC 1 * Temps by SIC 0.714 Year 2: region 15 * Temps by region 11.778 Gender -0.021
(6.267) (14.740) (0.036)
Year 4: SIC 2 * Temps by SIC 5.613 Year 2: region 16 * Temps by region 16.706 Qualification: degree+ 0.099
(7.507) (12.715) (0.068)
Year 4: SIC 3 * Temps by SIC -1.594 Year 2: region 17 * Temps by region 6.636 Qualification: A levels 0.092
(7.808) (11.584) (0.056)
Year 4: SIC 4 * Temps by SIC -2.516 Year 2: region 18 * Temps by region -9.171 Qualiication: O levels 0.065
(8.448) (12.659) (0.054)
Year 4: SIC 5 * Temps by SIC -0.819 Year 3: region 1 * Temps by region 5.754 Married 0.081**
(9.597) (10.366) (0.034)
Year 4: SIC 6 * Temps by SIC 1.026 Year 3: region 2 * Temps by region 11.896 Mother: low-skilled job -0.045
(6.407) (14.232) (0.057)
Year 4: SIC 7 * Temps by SIC 0.398 Year 3: region 3 * Temps by region 15.995 Mother: high-skilled job 0.061
(7.354) (16.294) (0.041)
Year 4: SIC 8 * Temps by SIC 0.428 Year 3: region 4 * Temps by region 8.850 General fertility rates -0.010
(5.763) (14.998) (0.034)
Year 4: SIC 9 * Temps by SIC 0.476 Year 3: region 5 * Temps by region 15.004 Claimant counts 0.000
(3.359) (13.648) (0.000)
Year 1: region 1 * Temps by region 4.226 Year 3: region 6 * Temps by region -3.391 Constant 1.648
(7.403) (16.011) (2.241)
Year 1: region 2 * Temps by region 4.721 Year 3: region 7 * Temps by region 8.583
(9.972) (15.927) Observations 1,426
Year 1: region 3 * Temps by region 3.470 Year 3: region 8 * Temps by region 14.776 Year Controls YES
(11.815) (22.926) Regional Controls YES
Year 1: region 4 * Temps by region -1.840 Year 3: region 9 * Temps by region 15.780 Only women NO
(11.263) (18.652) Only Married NO
Year 1: region 5 * Temps by region 15.969 Year 3: region 10 * Temps by region -7.128 Pseudo R-Squared 0.050
(14.526) (15.512) Log-likelihood -3041.849
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is no. of job spells in the first 4 years.
See Table A3.1 for definitions of regions and SICs. Reference categories: ‘SIC 0’; ‘region 19’; ‘Qualification: none’; ‘Mother: not employed’.
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Table A3.4: Estimates Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable Has children Has children Has children Has children Has children
(5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs)
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.045** -0.054** -0.050* -0.061** -0.074***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Age 0.023 0.037** 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.031
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Gender 0.454*** 0.090 0.171 -1.180***
(0.096) (0.116) (0.123) (0.369)
Qualification: degree+ -1.031*** -1.346*** -1.253*** -1.295*** -1.007***
(0.173) (0.229) (0.242) (0.246) (0.227)
Qualification: a levels -0.860*** -1.178*** -1.023*** -1.065*** -1.018***
(0.159) (0.214) (0.223) (0.226) (0.208)
Qualification: o levels -0.491*** -0.692*** -0.533** -0.532** -0.581***
(0.143) (0.211) (0.218) (0.222) (0.191)
Married 1.491*** 1.061***
(0.119) (0.137)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.345* -0.214 -0.205 -0.226 -0.441*
(0.191) (0.229) (0.237) (0.243) (0.234)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.106 -0.017 -0.028 -0.029 -0.191
(0.117) (0.136) (0.141) (0.141) (0.150)
Spouse has job -0.837*** -1.413***
(0.199) (0.257)
Spouse has job * Spouse is male 1.525***
(0.397)
General fertility rate -0.207*** -0.164* -0.156* -0.175* -0.270***
(0.073) (0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.092)
Claimant count -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 9.983** 8.891* 8.512 10.075* 14.223***
(4.359) (5.317) (5.413) (5.535) (5.509)
Observations 1,449 633 612 612 727
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO YES
Only Married NO YES YES YES NO
Pseudo R-Squared 0.266 0.130 0.160 0.179 0.211
Log-likelihood -454.453 -338.073 -317.675 -310.697 -296.104
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
takes value one if the individual has at least a child by the fifth year and zero otherwise. Reference
categories: ‘Qualification: none’, ‘Mother: not employed’.
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Table A3.5: Estimates Poisson: Living Arrangements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
Dependent variable Children Children Children Children
(5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs) (5 yrs)
No.jobs (4 yrs) -0.063** 0.082 -0.056* 0.075
(0.030) (0.048) (0.030) (0.048)
Age (at t0) 0.016 0.044** 0.010 0.032
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Qualification: degree+ -1.188*** -1.735*** -1.164*** -1.619***
(0.229) (0.236) (0.232) (0.244)
Qualification: a levels -0.994*** -1.747*** -0.981*** -1.637***
(0.219) (0.283) (0.216) (0.271)
Qualification: o levels -0.571*** -0.583*** -0.562*** -0.626***
(0.173) (0.189) (0.172) (0.187)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.308 -0.403 -0.288 -0.302
(0.287) (0.311) (0.286) (0.340)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.112 -0.151 -0.097 -0.143
(0.152) (0.174) (0.152) (0.167)
Married 2.210*** 2.920*** 2.199*** 2.784***
(0.207) (0.320) (0.207) (0.295)
Housing: mortgage 0.556** 1.008*** 0.419 0.785*
(0.249) (0.300) (0.374) (0.445)
Housing: social 0.688** 1.038*** 0.389 0.512
(0.285) (0.350) (0.416) (0.505)
Housing: rent -0.133 -0.127 -0.522 -0.898*
(0.316) (0.377) (0.427) (0.527)
Parents in hh -0.639*** -0.878*** -0.971** -1.270**
(0.160) (0.195) (0.480) (0.567)
Housing: mortgage * Parents in hh 0.154 0.081
(0.495) (0.584)
Housing: social * Parents in hh 0.434 0.598
(0.532) (0.613)
Housing: rent * Parents in hh 1.380** 2.289***
(0.589) (0.702)
General fertility rate -0.268*** -0.264** -0.261*** -0.316***
(0.097) (0.112) (0.097) (0.107)
Claimant count -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 12.597** 7.851 12.570** 10.195
(5.698) (7.144) (5.693) (15.982)
Observations 1,428 1,406 1,428 1,406
Year Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO
Only married NO NO NO NO
Pseudo R-Squared 0.240 . 0.245 .
Log-likelihood -599.797 . -596.029 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the no. of children after 5 years. Reference categories:
‘Qualification: none’, ‘Mother: not employed’, ‘Housing: owned’.
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Table A3.6: Estimates Poisson: Six Years After F-T Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson Poisson IV-Poisson
Dependent variable No. children No. children No. children No. children No. children No. children
(6 yrs) (6 yrs) (6 yrs) (6 yrs) (6 yrs) (6 yrs)
No. jobs (4 yrs) -0.062** 0.066 -0.047* -0.007 -0.102*** -0.071
(0.027) (0.049) (0.027) (0.047) (0.035) (0.065)
Age 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.037* 0.028
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Gender 0.506*** 0.592*** 0.197 0.235*
(0.128) (0.138) (0.120) (0.123)
Qualification: degree+ -1.050*** -1.374*** -1.140*** -1.469*** -0.900*** -1.047***
(0.182) (0.180) (0.178) (0.178) (0.221) (0.242)
Qualification: a levels -0.789*** -1.090*** -0.906*** -1.124*** -0.824*** -0.801***
(0.176) (0.171) (0.175) (0.169) (0.222) (0.247)
Qualification: o levels -0.454*** -0.572*** -0.486*** -0.609*** -0.508*** -0.421**
(0.155) (0.154) (0.158) (0.159) (0.186) (0.205)
Married 2.009*** 2.383*** 1.265*** 1.784***
(0.199) (0.241) (0.186) (0.228)
Mother: low-skilled job -0.325 -0.242 -0.251 -0.142 -0.200 -0.046
(0.242) (0.219) (0.250) (0.225) (0.273) (0.296)
Mother: high-skilled job -0.076 -0.257 -0.012 -0.119 -0.022 0.187
(0.141) (0.158) (0.148) (0.160) (0.172) (0.194)
General fertility rates -0.105 -0.059 -0.107 -0.042 0.002 0.108
(0.085) (0.087) (0.091) (0.092) (0.094) (0.103)
Claimant count 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 2.018 -2.626 3.850 -1.559 -2.956 -8.766
(5.128) (5.131) (5.487) (5.502) (5.602) (6.203)
Observations 1,248 1,229 631 626 627 615
Year Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Only women NO NO NO NO NO NO
Only Married NO NO YES YES NO NO
Pseudo R-Squared 0.207 , 0.082 , 0.128 ,
Log-likelihood -699.145 -554.668 -467.099 .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
the no. of children after 6 years. Reference categories: ‘Qualification: none’, ‘Mother: not employed’.
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